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Abstract
This work evaluates a digital cash phenomenon, called cryptocurrencies that was
started in early 2009 and has created a buzz at the latest in the year 2013, by the
virtual explosion of prices in currencies (e.g. prices in EUR or USD) for certain cryp-
tocurrencies, especially for bitcoin. The evaluation is realized from the perspective
of a software engineer. The central research question is derived of a claim made by
the Bitcoin community: Bitcoin does create “a new kind of money”. The potential
implications for existing payment systems would be tremendous if this proves to be
substantial. This issue is examined by performing a requirements analysis for pay-
ment systems in general, thereby establishing certain definitions and understandings
of terms, including ‘money’. An analysis and evaluation is also done for the Banking
Payment System (BPS) and the Cryptocurrency Payment System (CPS) with the
target to be able to draw conclusions for the CPS by comparing the two payment
systems. Furthermore a detailed evaluation of Bitcoin (first letter capitalized!) and
its proposed money called ‘bitcoin’ (non-capitalized!) is carried out by reverse en-
gineering parts of the software project using modeling technology that is known in
model driven software development.
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Preface
For reasons of the main research question and the research approach, this work is interconnecting
multiple different fields of research:
• Cryptography
• Cryptocurrencies
• Monetary theory and banking
• Software engineering
Some of these fields of research are closely interrelated, but that does not make up for the fact
that any reader of this work is going to be challenged by the multiple different terminologies
that ‘natives’ of each one of these fields readily utilize. In any case it was not deemed reasonable
to just assume that every reader of this work is going to be proficient in each one of these
different fields’ terminologies. For this reason a glossary was created for this work, even though
the ‘natives’ of each of the fields will probably consider ‘their’ terms as trivial and might wonder
about their explanatory inclusion in a glossary in a work such as the one at hand.
Glossary I hope that readers are going to make great use of the glossary, especially if terms
are hit in the work that are not part of the reader’s day-to-day language. Sometimes terms
are used in a very specific way in this work, potentially different from what would be expected
from an intuitive stance. The most use of the glossary can certainly be made when this work
is read in the portable document format (pdf), since the glossary terms are hyper-linked within
the document. Two terms I want to specifically mention here: Bitcoin and bitcoin. While being
separated by capitalization only, they have completely different meanings and are used almost
all throughout this work. Bitcoin is standing for the whole project and bitcoin is used as the
term for the money of account and the money proper of the Bitcoin project.
References Due to my aesthetic preference and unlike many publications within natural sci-
ences, the bibliography style of this document is set up in a way that citations are consisting only
of the last name of the (first) author of any publication and the year of publication. This made
it possible to include references to specific pages in reference works in a way I feel aesthetically
comfortable with.
Unpublished references were put into the bibliography only if they did provide a distinct date
of creation and a specific author. Other references, e.g. wiki pages, are referenced by URL
within a footnote only.
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Glossary Glossary
Glossary
address
is the cryptographic hash of the public key of a private/public key-pair; the address con-
ceptually ’holds’ bitcoins by providing access to the bitcoins at a transaction point. xi,
xvi, xvii, 9, 41, 54, 55, 59
ASIC
application-specific integrated circuit. 61
asset
is a thing or a right that is priced at the current valuation of expected cash flows (e.g.
generated income or potential sale). xiii–xv, 5, 11, 15, 20, 24–30, 34, 44, 51–53, 58, 60,
70–72, 79
BaFin
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht. 78
bankmoney
is a term used for the money proper created by commercial banks by expanding their
balance sheets in an exchange of IOUs with their debtors. 18, 48, 60, 61, 68, 69, 71–76,
79, 82
Bitcoin
the cryptocurrency project that calls its money proper and its money of account “bitcoin”;
in this work the Bitcoin project serves as the example for cryptocurrencies in general. iii,
iv, ix, xi, xiii, xvi, 1–7, 9, 12, 14, 19, 27, 30, 34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 42–45, 47–54, 56, 58–62,
64, 65, 67–69, 74, 77–79
bitcoin
refers to the money proper and to the money of account of Bitcoin. iii, iv, xi–xiii, xvi,
xvii, 2, 4, 5, 9, 14, 26, 30, 34, 35, 37, 40–48, 50–62, 64, 65, 68, 69, 74, 76, 78, 79
block
is a file that contains a link to the previous block and holds a set of transactions that have
not been included in any preceding block in the blockchain. xi–xvi, 9, 39, 42–48, 57, 60,
61
blockchain
is a collection of blocks that are each linked to exactly one other block; the current
blockchain contains all blocks, beginning with the genesis block leading to the most recent
generated block. xi–xiii, xv, 4, 39, 42–48, 54, 57, 59, 65
BPS
Banking Payment System. iii, ix, 1, 2, 5, 10–12, 19, 35, 37, 49, 53, 61, 62, 64, 66, 68, 69,
71, 74, 76, 78, 79
buyer
is in this work specifically an actor that is buying bitcoins for currency on exchanges that
are part of the Bitcoin EcoSystem. 60, 61
ciphertext
is encrypted information. Plaintext becomes ciphertext by encryption. By decryption
ciphertext becomes plaintext again. xi, 7
xi
Glossary Glossary
client
is an application that implements all the functions necessary to be able to operate as a
node within the Network. xv, xvii, 4, 40, 41, 47, 55
coinbase
is a name for the first output transaction in a generated block that actually does create
brand new bitcoins, which are given to the miner as a reward for successfully hashing the
block. 44, 46–48
CPS
Cryptocurrency Payment System. iii, ix, 1, 2, 5, 10–12, 19, 30, 35, 37, 44, 49–56, 61, 62,
64, 65, 67, 69, 72, 74, 78
cryptocurrency
is a recent (since 2009) type of digital cash scheme that does make use of cryptography
to prevent its users from double-spending the digital money proper, employing a public
ledger file called blockchain. iii, xi–xiii, xv, xvi, 1–5, 7–10, 13–15, 19, 26–28, 37–41, 50,
54, 58, 62, 64, 66–69, 73, 74, 76–82
cryptographic hash function
is a hash function that is considered to be practically impossible to invert. Meaning there
is no practical way to recreate the original data from the message digest. 8, 9
cryptographic protocol
is a protocol that defines what has to be done by what agent and in what sequence to
reach a certain goal; in the cryptocurrency context it defines what is required for the
cryptocurrency to work properly. 4, 6–8, 12, 48, 64, 66
cryptography
is the practice and study of techniques for encoding and decoding information, for the
purpose of secure communication in the presence of third parties that are to be excluded
form the communication. xii, xiii, 1, 2, 6, 7, 14, 15, 82
currency
type of money that is supported by a government or a nation state by declaring it as legal
tender within its jurisdiction. iii, xi, xiii, xvi, 2, 4, 5, 14–16, 18, 26, 27, 29, 40, 58–61, 64,
72, 73, 76, 78, 79
debt
is the, potentially intentional, result of the avoidance of a payment; a certain amount of
money proper, specified in the money of account, is payable by the debtor at a certain
date to the creditor. xiv
deep modeling
is a term coined at the Chair for Software Development of the University of Mannheim,
Germany; is a type of modeling that i.a. - contrary to conventional meta-modeling - has
a systematic place for domain meta-types and therefore allows their seamless inclusion
within the models. 2
difficulty
is the relative measure Tmin/Tact with Tact being the target of the block at hand and Tmin
the smallest possible target. 47
digital cash
is a digital form of money proper that is digitally created, saved and spent. iii, xii, 3, 4
xii
Glossary Glossary
domain
is a research area that has common requirements, functionality and terminology. E.g. the
domain of this work is cryptocurrencies and the terminology of it can be found within this
glossary. xiv, 2, 11, 13, 40, 64, 73, 77, 82
double-spending
is a failure-mode of digital payment systems; if digital money proper can be duplicated
the way files can be, its functionality is undermined; if double-spending is possible the
whole payment system fails; the way double-spending is prevented in cryptocurrencies
using a public ledger called the blockchain by employing cryptography technology is the
key innovation of Bitcoin. xii, xiii, 3, 4, 37–39, 44–46, 48, 55, 59
ECDSA
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm. xvii, 9, 41
EcoSystem
the most widely conceivable Bitcoin related system that includes the Bitcoin Network as
well as businesses and service providers that account for additional use cases, for example
allow buyers and sellers of bitcoin to trade in other (foreign) currency. xi, xvi, 4, 35, 53,
59–62, 64, 76
fiat money
is a term used to indicate that the money proper of a payment system viewed as a simple
asset, without the properties that made it money proper, would have a price no different
from or very close to zero. As an example may serve the proverbial paper note that itself
is just a piece of paper but gains value through the properties that made it money proper
as a paper bill. 26, 27
funding liquidity
is the ability to put off payments when they come due, by paying someone else to make
them. 28
generated block
a block is generated if it was successfully mined. xi, xii, xvi, 43–48
genesis block
is the first block in a blockchain; the genesis block for Bitcoin was created including
information about the date of creation (by means of a mainstream media headline related
to monetary policy matters of that date), to maintain that no previous mining and thereby
creation of bitcoin had happened. xi, xiii, 4, 43, 44
hash function
is any function that can be fed with arbitrary length inputs, to create fixed length outputs.
Receiving slight changes in the input, useful hash functions produce dramatic changes in
the output, and allow successful mapping with (almost) no collisions. xii, xiv
hashing
is the creation of a message digest using a cryptographic hash function on data of arbitrary
size. xi, xii, xiv–xvi, 39, 41, 42, 44–46
inside money
is some form of credit within the hierarchy of money, yet its transfer is used and accepted
xiii
Glossary Glossary
as a means of final settlement of debt, thereby making it money proper. 69, 72, 74, 75,
78, 79
IOU
acronym for ‘I owe you’. Indicates a creditor-debtor relationship. x, 48, 69–71, 75
ISO
International Standards Organization. xvii
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007/2008 was a crisis of financial institutions. In November 2008, shortly
after the heydays of the crisis, a white paper was released, claiming that - by combining open
source, peer-to-peer technology and cryptography - a payment system could be established
that does not require financial institutions or any central agency, service or counterparty (see
Nakamoto, 2008).
1.1 Motivation
Is it possible that network technology could revolutionize yet another business branch? The
inception of E-Mails put pressure on postal services, the utilization of file-sharing systems forced
content providers to rethink their business models and while ‘blogging’ is still partly ridiculed by
established mass media outlets, hardly one can be found that does not also publish information
by using web-logs today (see Falkvinge, 2011).
Could the inception of cryptocurrencies1 mean that “a new kind of money”2 was created?
Does it force a redefinition of business models for financial institutions? To what extent could
this redefinition be necessary? Could the decentralized payment system based on cryptography,
we call the Cryptocurrency Payment System (CPS) change or even replace the currently used
Banking Payment System (BPS) that is based on financial institutions and their cooperation
worldwide? Could this render financial crisis’ obsolete? These and other questions arise, if
cryptocurrencies are a new kind of money. This work’s aim is to contribute to finding an answer
to the question if cryptocurrencies indeed are a new kind of money.
1.2 Research objective
The work present is generic in nature, and is therefore concerned with cryptocurrencies and their
capabilities in general. However the first and oldest of the cryptocurrency projects, the Bitcoin
project, which exists publicly since early 2009, is used as the prime example of a cryptocurrency
in this work. All specific examples and models that involve a cryptocurrency are based on the
properties of the Bitcoin project. The central objective for this work is to examine the claim of
the Bitcoin community that with the creation of cryptocurrencies “a new kind of money” was
created. To be able to do this kind of examination the Bitcoin project needs to be looked at
from an information systems perspective, as well as from a monetary theory perspective.
1.3 Research approach
Since the claim to examine is that the invention of cryptocurrencies created “a new kind of
money”, it is necessary to establish an understanding of the term money. We approach this issue
from a requirements engineering perspective on payment systems in that we ask the question:
What does a payment system have to be able to provide for it to be used as such by a significantly
large share of the population? What indeed are the requirements for a payment system?
In software development projects modeling technology is used to reduce complexity in the
development process by being able to strip business logic complexity of the one that the imple-
mentation itself comprises. In this way modeling technology facilitates the creation of yet to
develop software systems. In this work we use modeling technology to visualize properties of
systems that already do exist. In this case the worldwide payment system that is operated by
financial institutions, we call BPS, and the decentralized CPS that is claimed to potentially be
1One of the first indications of the term ‘cryptocurrency’ in a mainstream media outlet can be found on
http://www.forbes.com - accessed May 13th 2014.
2This is a claim commonly formulated by the Bitcoin community: “Bitcoin is an innovative payment network
and a new kind of money” - www.bitcoin.org/en - accessed May 13th 2014.
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able to replace it or parts of it.3 By using modeling technology we hope to be able to show in
detail what the capabilities of the CPS are and then examine and compare these capabilities to
those offered by the BPS. We approach these payment systems mainly from the viewpoint of an
end-user or customer of these systems.
1.4 Structure
The first part of this work is a very short introduction to the cryptocurrency world and the
payment system that operates on cryptocurrency technology in section 2. It is followed by
the brief section 3 on cryptography, since cryptographic technology is used in the realization
of cryptocurrencies and comprehending certain cryptographic procedures is not avoidable for a
concise understanding of the working of cryptocurrencies. Finishing the basic sections is section
4 that is outlining specific areas of software engineering fundamentals that encompass procedures
or techniques that were used in this work to further analyse the mentioned payment systems and
their capabilities. Specifically modeling technology is going to be depicted, including not only
conventional or ’shallow’ modeling technology, but also deep modeling is going to be delineated.
In section 5 we are trying to find definitions for very key terms: money, currency and payment
systems.
The approach in section 6 is to further inquire the term money using requirements analysis
of a hypothetical payment system. We do this to be able to proceed with the examination of
both the currently most widely used payment system, we call the BPS and the payment system
based on cryptocurrency technology, we call the CPS.
Section 7 is an extensive assessment of Bitcoin by going into detail on fundamental principles
of cryptocurrencies. Bitcoin thereby serving as our example for a CPS. We are starting with
the explanation of important terms that are essential for the understanding of cryptocurrencies
and then outlining the inner workings of Bitcoin using modeling and requirements engineering
approaches.
In section 8 we are examining the BPS after we introduce what we call ‘the money view on
actuality’, which is a view effectively developed throughout the course of this work. We are
focusing on the BPS, keeping in mind that it is currently the most dominant payment system
and therefore must be considered to fulfil the requirements elicited for a payment system in
section 6.
We draw a conclusion on our findings of the work, especially for the cryptocurrency examined
in this work, called Bitcoin, in section 9. Finally, we touch upon multiple possibilities for future
research in this domain that look promising.
3“Can Bitcoin replace PayPal?” - http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/10/business/
will-bitcoin-replace-paypal/ - accessed May 14th 2014.
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2 Cryptocurrencies - a quick overview
In this introductory section we want to give a quick overview over digital cash and the specific
type of digital cash that is subsumed under the label ‘cryptocurrency’. We start with some
reflections on digital cash in general and the specific challenges the attempted digitalization of
money poses. Then we introduce cryptocurrencies that embody a form of digital cash scheme
that offers a decentralized solution to the challenges that digital cash schemes face. We also give
a quick overview on the current state of use of the oldest and most widespread cryptocurrency
that is called Bitcoin.
2.1 Digital cash
At the very first glance the demand for digital cash seems obvious, since for about twenty years
now, we are on the road to ‘the digital economy’ (see Tapscott, 1995) and what better way to
pay in a digital economy than with digital cash? At second glance however the question arises
how exactly ‘digital cash’ would actually work.
Specific challenges for digital cash If Alice is able to pay Bob4 by the transfer of a specific
sequence of bits, then what is going to stop Alice from simply copying the sequence and ‘pay’
Carol, too? In fact, what would stop her from copying the bitstring over and over again? Or
looking at it from the opposite angle: what would stop a counterfeiter to reproduce the bitstring
that actually is Alice’s and thereby steal from her? This is but a small fraction of challenges
that revolve around the potential susceptibility of digital cash for fraud, security breaches and
counterfeiting. A central issue for digital cash schemes to resolve and that we want to focus on
here briefly is the so called issue of double-spending.
Double-spending - a central issue for digital cash Very important yet trivial for successful
payments in general is the inability for a payer to pay two (or more) payees with the very same
money proper5. In other words: if it is possible for a payer to double-spend the identical money
proper, then this type of money proper is not suitable for payments. A money proper that can
be double-spent would be immediately rejected in future attempts to pay. Double-spending is a
very crucial challenge for digital cash schemes to overcome, since it is very easy to simply copy
digital information.
Central authority as solution If a central authority was part of the digital cash scheme and it
was trusted by all participants then the double-spending problem could be resolved by checking
the legitimacy of each payment transaction with the central authority. In a scheme of this kind
the digital cash would be an actual digital token that was completely administered by the central
authority, which would therefore act much like a bank. While a perfectly working central party
alleviates the problems mentioned, including double-spending, it might be considered a great
risk for the entire digital cash scheme to be totally dependent on the soundness of just one
central authority. If it failed in any way, the entire system would be affected. In the past the
digital cash schemes based on tokens and a central authority have hardly even succeeded as the
mere customer loyalty systems they have been so far, let alone succeeding as an actual cash
4Alice and Bob are commonly used placeholder names, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_and_Bob -
accessed June 28th 2014.
5see section 6.2 to find the definition of this term and why it is used here instead of the more general term
money.
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equivalent.6 Cryptocurrencies on the other hand are a kind of digital cash scheme that claim
to have resolved the crucial issue of double-spending completely without the need for a trusted
central authority or even a central party of any kind.
2.2 What is a cryptocurrency?
In this work we recognize a cryptocurrency as a digital cash scheme that does not need the sup-
port of a central server or other trusted central party to prevent its users from ‘double-spending’,
but instead relies on a specific cryptographic protocol to do so. Furthermore cryptocurrencies
operate on a peer-to-peer basis with nodes running client software that is typically open source.
Hereafter we introduce the Bitcoin project by depicting some key features. The detailed descrip-
tion and explanation of the underlying cryptographic protocol however follows further below, as
it is an essential part of section 7.
Bitcoin - the inception of cryptocurrencies The first and therefore oldest cryptocurrency
project started in January of 2009 with the public release of the standard client source code and
the initial calculation of the genesis block.7 Its inventor Satoshi Nakamoto8 gave the project the
name ‘Bitcoin’ in a white paper that was released in late 2008 (see Nakamoto, 2008). In this
work it is the cryptocurrency project Bitcoin that is going to be used as the prime example for
cryptocurrencies in general.
Transactions Bitcoin allows payments to be made within the Network by executing transac-
tions that are fast, cheap and irreversible.9 An average waiting time of ten minutes for the
initial and about 60 minutes for the final confirmation10 of an international payment, sounds
very compelling and is indeed very fast compared to the alternative of a standard commercial
bank money transfer that can take multiple days in international venues.11 Once the transaction
is finally confirmed it is irreversible. Additionally the transaction costs of a bitcoin transaction
are - at least so far - nothing but minuscule compared to bank transfers or credit card payments.
For more details on transactions see section 7.2.2.
Bitcoins are traded in traditional currencies On exchanges that formed within the Bitcoin
EcoSystem traders can buy or sell bitcoins for traditional currencies, such as USD or EUR. The
exchanges are so far the interface between the Network and the traditional monetary system.
While the price of bitcoin in USD has been very volatile all along it has been rising from being
essentially zero at inception to about $ 600 per one bitcoin in June of 2014, reaching highs in
late November of 2013 of more than $ 1100.
6One example of a completely failed digital cash scheme of the token and central authority kind is beenz.com.
See ‘The greatest defunct Web sites and dotcom disasters’ (June 5th 2008) - http://web.archive.org/web/
20080607211845/http://crave.cnet.co.uk/0,39029477,49296926-7,00.htm - accessed June 26th 2014.
7This is a reference to the key innovation of Bitcoin: the public ledger called blockchain that started on Jan 3rd
2009 with the genesis block - https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Genesis_block - accessed June 28th 2014.
8This name is probably a pseudonym, potentially for a group of people, however there is a claim
by newsweek for it being the real name of one person only: http://www.newsweek.com/2014/03/14/
face-behind-bitcoin-247957.html - accessed June 10th 2014.
9For a list of these properties, see http://www.coindesk.com/information/why-use-bitcoin/ - accessed June
10th 2014.
10The first confirmation of a transaction happens after approximately 10 minutes, a chart that shows confirmation
time can be accessed here: http://blockchain.info/charts/avg-confirmation-time - accessed June 28th
2014.
11While being limited in the transferable amounts, payments by credit cards are even faster than the confirmation
of Bitcoin transactions, since the credit card company is paid by the payee for acting as a fiduciary middleman.
Using fiduciary trust in this way is something that can be reproduced for Bitcoin transactions, making them
potentially equally fast, however obviously introducing a trusted third party in doing so.
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No central authority In early 2013 the price increase in USD for bitcoins coincided with prob-
lems in financial stability in Cyprus. Amongst other measures the government of Cyprus decided
to lower the allowed cash (money proper) limit to € 1000 per traveler. By various means, includ-
ing the levying of special taxes, the government of Cyprus also called on businesses and private
households that owned savings accounts with more than a € 100.000 balance in the effort to re-
instate financial stability in Cyprus (see Stavárek, 2013, pg 316). Recognizing the decentralized
cryptocurrency infrastructure, central governments are very limited in their abilities to levy spe-
cial taxes of this kind on cryptocurrencies. In the context of central governments trying to levy
special fees or taxes, albeit under the guise of general welfare, the conjuncture that there simply
is no central point of reference in cryptocurrencies can be viewed as an immense advantage for
individual users.
Why are cryptocurrencies not prevalent? Most of the above in this section could be construed
as advertisement, even though Bitcoin is, after all, not run by a for profit corporation that
has a marketing budget. Still, the properties of Bitcoin described so far could be perceived
as almost too good to be true (to recap pointedly: “open-source, peer-to-peer, cheap, fast,
secure, irreversible, rising prices, safe from arbitrary intervention of governments et cetera”).
So the payment system powered by cryptocurrency technology should be already the most used
payment system out there, shouldn’t it? But since it is not, even though the properties sound
so compelling, we are confronted with the question “why isn’t it?” Why are private businesses
and organizations at large not pricing their assets, goods and services in bitcoin? Why do
private households still at large shy away from pricing their properties or other assets in some
cryptocurrency?
Is it just technically too difficult to use for average households and businesses? Is it possible
that the still rare usage is a mere usability issue? Cryptocurrencies would not be the first on-line
technology that was invented years before broad or even mass adoption and usage started for
mere improvements in usability.12
Maybe potential users just do not know enough about the new cryptocurrency payment sys-
tems and their capabilities. Are potential users just too uninformed about the possibilities that
the new cryptocurrencies provide? If this was true, it would be a mere hermeneutical chal-
lenge and as soon as the education about cryptocurrencies is advanced and successful enough
they would reign supreme in usage amongst the payment systems worldwide, considering the
seemingly obvious advantages in velocity and cost of transactions to perform payments.
The working hypothesis Perhaps it is neither simply a usability or an educational issue nor
just a combination of both. Potentially there is a deeper reason that has so far prevented the
mass adoption of cryptocurrencies that still have not had their march of triumph as ‘a new kind
of money’ yet. In fact, it is going to be the working hypothesis for this work that something
indeed is prohibiting bitcoin from mass adoption that goes beyond usability or educational
issues and it probably has to do with risk avoidance of potential users.13 These considerations
concerning risks could be revolving around the volatility in the price of bitcoin compared to
other currencies. The potential users most likely have expenses that are nominated in those
currencies and they need to cover these expenses when they are due by transferring the money
proper of those currencies, they can not rely solely upon the cryptocurrency income.14
12This is an idea from Falkvinge (2011).
13Refer to footnote 31 for expedia.com on one hand announcing its willingness to ‘accept’ bitcoins as payment
but at the same time strictly limiting the acceptance to certain use cases and announcing the unwillingness
to holding bitcoins, due to risk avoidance.
14This issue is going to occupy us throughout this work, but for reflections on risk reduction specifically, see section
6.6 on the Money Meta Infrastructure (MMI) that Bitcoin, seen as a Cryptocurrency Payment System, shows
significant differences in compared to the MMI that the Banking Payment System is embedded in.
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Security Bitcoin is designed to prevent the tampering with information, impersonation and
outright stealing of others. In this sense Bitcoin is all about making sure the integrity of
transactions is always guaranteed. This is a challenge that is generally well known to the
physical world, where it is dealt with by signatures, bank vaults, safes and locks of various kind.
In the world of bits and bytes this challenge is tackled by employing cryptography and this
is exactly what Bitcoin does and this is why it can also be viewed as being a cryptographic
protocol.
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3 Cryptography
On the one hand it is not necessary, on the other it is way beyond the scope of this work to
go into detail about cryptography. However to comprehend the fundamental principles that
cryptocurrencies work on in some detail, it is helpful to understand the basic ideas of certain
cryptographic principles. The principles that are specifically relevant for the cryptographic
protocol that is implemented by the cryptocurrency project Bitcoin, are going to be briefly
explained in this section.
3.1 Symmetric cryptography
Cryptography is the study of technologies that allow secure communication that is the exchange
of information unscathed by third party adversaries, who potentially want to intrude, listen to
or change the communication. So, if Alice wants to send information to Bob securely, the basic
idea is to not just send the information as plaintext - say by E-Mail - from Alice to Bob, but
for Alice to use a key to encrypt the information and sending it to Bob as ciphertext. The same
key can later be used by Bob to decrypt the information to make it human readable again. This
way Alice and Bob can send each other messages that cannot be read by third parties as long
as Alice and Bob are holding the key exclusively and the encryption cannot be broken.
Alice and Bob obviously have to exchange the key before being able to communicate securely.
This can be a problem for multiple reasons. If Alice and Bob are communicating on-line the
simple exchange of the key as plaintext undermines the intent to encrypt information at all,
since a key that was sent as plaintext via internet communication can be considered the release
of this key to the whole world. Using this key still with the intent to communicate securely,
even though it was transferred in plaintext between Alice and Bob beforehand, is blatantly
imprudent. So for symmetric cryptography to work in the intended way, there needs to be an
initial key exchange of at least one secret key. This key exchange needs to be secure in the sense
that after the exchange the keys are known by the intended parties (here: Alice and Bob) and
stay secret for everybody else.
One possible way to exchange keys securely is to arrange a physical meeting and exchange
the keys without third party interference. However the physical meeting to do a key exchange
can be problematic in itself and is especially impractical for fast-paced on-line technologies, like
cryptocurrencies.
There is a way to overcome this key exchange problem, by using another cryptographic algo-
rithm that involves not only a single key, but a key-pair, where one key is released to the public
and the other key stays private, the encryption is done with one key, the decryption with the
other. This class of algorithms is called ‘public key cryptography’ or ‘asymmetric cryptography’.
3.2 Asymmetric cryptography - public key cryptography
Public key cryptography is a class of cryptographic algorithms that involve two separate keys.
The two keys are mathematically linked in such a way that allows the encryption of data with
one key and the decryption with the other. The user now has the option to make one of the keys
public (so called ‘public key’) and to keep the other one secret (so called ‘private key’). For the
sending of encrypted text the encryption is done with the public key and the decryption with
the private key. The algorithm makes use of the fact that mathematical problems exist that
currently cannot be solved efficiently. While it is necessary for the user to be able to calculate a
private and a public key in reasonable time, the calculation of the private key from knowing the
public key has to be mathematically infeasible to make the algorithm work (see Katz & Lindell,
2007, pg. 333ff.).
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Figuratively speaking we could think of public key cryptography as if it was a system of boxes
and padlocks. The public key in this metaphor would consist of a box with an open padlock
that could be closed by anyone who is in front of the padlock. To open the box that was locked
with the padlock and find out what contents were put in you need the key to the padlock. So
if Bob wants to communicate securely with Alice, he needs to create a key-pair and publish his
public key. Alice then can use Bob’s public key to encrypt plaintext she wants to send to Bob.
In the metaphor this is putting something into the box and locking it with Bob’s padlock. If we
assume that the box is unbreakable, the padlock cannot be picked and that only Alice holds a
key to her padlock, then indeed only Alice has access to whatever is in the box.
Notably there is no need for an initial secure exchange of a private key, since Alice doesn’t
need access to Bob’s private key. She can use his public key to encrypt whatever plaintext she
chooses, yet only Bob is going to be able to decrypt the ciphertext back to plaintext using his
private key.
Diffie-Hellman handshake One possible use of these types of algorithms is the exchange of
a secret key between two parties that initially do not know anything about each other. After
the establishment of a common secret key, the two parties can start to communicate securely
using symmetric cryptography. This is generally done by the calculation of a shared secret,
using mathematical problems that - at current understanding - do not allow for an efficient solu-
tion. This process was first described and published by Diffie and Hellman, using a fundamental
group in number theory (‘multiplicative group of integers modulo n’) as source for the mathe-
matical problem, and is therefore often called ‘Diffie-Hellman key-exchange’ or ‘Diffie-Hellman
handshake’ (Diffie & Hellman, 1976).
Most relevant insight Generally speaking the most relevant insight about asymmetric cryp-
tography is the realization that it is possible for two initially unknown parties who communicate
over an unsecured channel to generate a shared secret key that can be subsequently used for
secure communication.
Even though the word ‘cryptocurrency’ does signal the use of cryptography, neither symmetric
nor asymmetric cryptography is used in the most basic cryptocurrency protocol. For this works
purpose asymmetric cryptography is mentioned to facilitate the understanding of cryptographic
hashing and digital signature algorithms, which are both heavily used in cryptocurrencies and
are explained hereafter.
3.3 Cryptographic hashing
If Alice sends encrypted messages using Bob’s public key for encryption, then Bob can read the
message by applying his private key to receive plaintext again. However Bob cannot be sure
that the message was not altered on the way to him. To alleviate this problem Alice can use a
cryptographic hash function to create a message digest (also called ‘hash value’ or ‘digest’) and
append it to the message. Bob can then himself use the cryptographic hash function, create
a digest himself and compare it with the one he received by Alice attached to the original
message. Cryptographic hash functions are designed in a way that they produce fixed length
outputs (message digests) off of inputs of variable length. For these functions to be useful they
are practically impossible to invert, meaning that someone receiving the hash value alone cannot
create the original message from it (see Katz & Lindell, 2007, pg. 278ff.). So if Bob finds the
two hash values are the same, he can be (reasonably) sure the message he received remained
intact on the way to him.
However there is another challenge for Alice to make sure the message digest got sent to Bob
intact, because if the message digest is altered on the way to Bob, then he cannot successfully
8
3 CRYPTOGRAPHY 3.4 Digital signature algorithms
compare the digest he received with the one he created himself. One way to do this is the
inclusion of the message digest in a digital signature.
Most relevant insight Cryptographic hashing is the creation of a message digest (also called
hash value or just hash and sometimes digest) of fixed length by application of a cryptographic
hash function on a message of variable length. It is used on multiple occasions in cryptocurren-
cies, this includes the hashing of the header of a block, which is part of mining and the hashing
of Bitcoin addresses. It is also applied in what is called a Merkle tree, which is a tree structure
that hashes the hashes of data until there is only one root hash left (see Nakamoto, 2008, pg.
4).
3.4 Digital signature algorithms
Digital signatures are a class of public key algorithms, and therefore use a mathematically linked
key-pair as all public key algorithms do. In the asymmetric cryptography algorithm depicted
above however, the encryption was done using the public key and the decryption was done using
the private key. Digital signatures are carried out vice versa. Within digital signature algorithms
the encryption is done using the private key and the decryption using the public key (see Katz
& Lindell, 2007, pg. 421ff.).
If Bob was Alice’s banker it could be necessary to prevent third party adversaries to imper-
sonate Alice and perform actions on her account that she never approved off. So Bob wants to
make sure that messages he supposedly got from Alice were actually sent by her. To accomplish
this requirement, Alice could include a digital signature with her message.
For a digital signature to be created the first step is to create a digest by using a cryptographic
hash function, as was depicted above in section 3.3. The second step is the encryption of the
digest using the private key. Finally this digital signature is attached to the message.
1. Create a message digest
2. Encrypt the digest using the private key
3. Attach encrypted digest to the message
With digital signatures it becomes possible for Bob who has just received a message from
Alice to verify that the message indeed was sent by Alice (‘authentication’) that it has not been
altered on the way (‘integrity’) and if Alice still maintains that the private key that was used
to digitally sign the message, is still private, then Alice cannot shy away from the responsibility
that comes with having actually sent the message (‘non-repudiation’).
Most relevant insight Digital signatures are pretty much used like signatures in the physical
world. Sophisticated mathematics can make digital signatures potentially as forgery-proof as
real world signatures or make them even tougher to forge and therefore more secure. In Bitcoin
an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is used for the signing of transactions.
The current owner of a sum of bitcoins signs the transfer to the new owner, by including the
new owner’s public key as an output in the transaction and then signing using his private key.
This is going to be depicted in much more detail in section 7.
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4 Software engineering
It is way beyond the scope of this work to give a comprehensive introduction to software engi-
neering or even a detailed analysis of the multiple different practices, methods and principles of
software engineering that reach from rigorously formalized approaches to much more informal
and agile methods.
It is the aim of this section to introduce the sub-disciplines of software engineering that include
practices that were used to approach the central issue of this work, which is the question if a
recently invented open-source peer-to-peer software system, we call the Cryptocurrency Payment
System (CPS), can in any way change or even replace the already long existing Banking Payment
System (BPS). To do this the attempt is to understand these two payment systems as profoundly
as possible and to achieve this, we employ practices out of software engineering. Essentially we
are taking a look at existing systems from a software engineering perspective. The BPS is a
complex system that is partly a software system, too, but cannot be reduced to being just
that. Therefore the initial starting point of this section could actually even be set to ‘systems
engineering’ that software engineering is a part of. But we will start at this point with software
engineering, more specifically with the sub-disciplines of it relevant for this work: Requirements,
Software design and Software engineering models and methods. The whole section is oriented on
the ‘Software Engineering Body of Knowledge V3.0’ (Bourque & Fairley, 2014) and was inspired
by Sommerville (2011).
4.1 Requirements and Design
In software engineering the requirements can be thought of as the bridge between the so called
real world and the world of software-intensive systems. They are essentially the translation of
real world needs into a form that can be realized as a software artefact. In this sense requirements
are a reflection of real world problems that can be read and understood by software engineers,
who then again translate requirements into actual software systems.
Typically requirements are defined early on in the software development process. Starting
with an analysis of the real world problems and the environment that the system will be later
used in, requirements are defined as a specification of what the system is supposed to be doing.
Requirements can also put constraints on systems. Either as specification or as constraints,
requirements define for the software developer what needs to be implemented and also how the
implementation should be executed (see Bourque & Fairley, 2014, p. 1-1).
Definition Requirements define what the system should or should not do. This is a very
general definition that does not take into account that there are specific types of requirements.
An example for a requirement is:
“The system shall provide a service that allows a user (payer) to safely pay another
user (payee), within one business day, thereby conforming to all laws applicable.”
The requirements process The requirements process is conceptually split into the activities of
elicitation, analysis, specification and verification (see Bourque & Fairley, 2014, pg. 1-3). Even
though this may sound like a linear process, and it is indeed initiated at the very beginning of
a software development endeavour, it is neither linear nor finished up front. The requirements
process is a continually running process throughout the software life cycle, while the requirements
are constantly analysed, specified and refined.
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Product and process requirements A requirement may concern the product, meaning the
system that is to be developed, or the process of development. An example for a product
requirement is:
“The system shall yield a money proper that allows the users to perform payments.”
An example for a process requirement is:
“The system shall be developed according to the Rational Unified Process (RUP).”
Functional requirement Functional requirements describe the features of the system, for ex-
ample the ability to execute payments within a certain time. They also may state what the
system should not do. It is possible to test for the fulfilment of a functional requirement by a
finite set of test steps. In any way functional requirements describe how the system is supposed
to react to particular inputs and in particular situations. As functional user requirements, they
are very high-level statements, just as:
“The money of account of the system shall have properties that lead to the voluntary
pricing of assets, goods and services by the users.”
As functional system requirements however they should describe the system services in detail.
Non-functional requirement Non-Functional requirements are the constraints for the system
and are sometimes also called quality requirements and apply therefore often to the system as a
whole rather than to a specific feature or service. They can be classified further into requirements
concerning security, reliability, safety, interoperability, performance or any other type of quality
characteristic. An example of a non-functional product requirement
Emergent property An emergent property is a type of requirement that is dependent on the
collaboration of many components of the system. The above mentioned requirement of pricing
assets with a certain money of account depends on how all the system components interact under
real-life operating conditions. This requirement clearly is an emergent property for a payment
system, which is going to be further explored in section 6.3.
Stakeholders It is an important issue for a requirements engineer to appreciate that not only
the potential users of a system can and do provide requirements. Various kinds of direct and
indirect stakeholders are also able to contribute requirements or facilitate the understanding of
requirements that are already elicited. To put it in another way: stakeholders are prone to lose
something if the system does not conform to their requirements.
Requirements document The requirements document is a desired product of the requirements
process. The continuous refinement of requirements through analysis, specification and verifi-
cation iteratively improves the requirements document, which therefore is never finished at any
one point during the software life cycle. The changes in the requirements document are often
so frequent and quick that many agile software engineering methods, consider even creating a
requirements document a waste of time. They are instead handling requirements in what is
called user stories (see Sommerville, 2011, 3.3).
As a side note at this point: In this work there is not going to be an exhaustive requirements
document produced for either one of the evaluated payment systems (BPS, CPS and a non-
existent hypothetical payment system). The actual creation of a comprehensive requirements
document for payment systems could be a field of potential further enquiry. However this
could be more difficult than initially thought of. The specifics of the payment systems domain
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Non-Functional
Requirements
Functional
Requirements
translated into SoftwareSystemtranslated into RequirementsRealWorld
problem
Figure 1: Object diagram on requirements, using concepts of the UML.
might cause certain stakeholders that are currently influential in the BPS (potentially particular
nation states and other important stakeholders), to refrain from disclosure of all of their actual
requirements. This is an example for special challenges that requirements engineers can face
during the requirements engineering process. In this case actual requirements are simply not
mentioned during requirements elicitation for lack of interest in disclosure of these requirements
by the respective stakeholders.
Conceptual Modeling It is part of the requirements analysis activity within the requirements
process to create models of real-world problems.
“[C]onceptual models comprise models of entities from the problem domain, config-
ured to reflect their real-world relationships and dependencies.” (Bourque & Fairley,
2014, pg. 1-8)
We will apply modeling technology during the requirements analysis of payment systems in
section 6 and for the understanding of Bitcoin and the analysis and evaluation of both the CPS
and BPS. A very simple example for a graphical model of some of the contents of this section on
requirements is shown in figure 1, using most basic modeling concepts (including generalization).
This structural model is conforming to the general-purpose modeling language UML that was
defined by Booch et al. (1998).
Design transforms requirements Software design transforms requirements into a description
of how to solve the real-world problem at hand and includes the planning of a software solution
for this problem. Design encompasses both low-level component and even algorithm design as
well as high-level, architecture design (see Bourque & Fairley, 2014, pg. 2-1).
Reverse engineering existing designs in this work As we are involved in design activities in
this work, we are reverse engineering already existing systems that realize a certain design. It is
the task to reveal first the architectural design of the existing systems. We will go into reverse
engineering of algorithm design in section 7, when we discuss the inner workings of the Bitcoin
protocol.
4.2 Software engineering models and methods
The aim of scientific modeling in general is to make the comprehension of a particular part
of the world easier. The intention for the use of modeling technology is the very same in
software engineering. One key intention in using graphical modeling languages is to facilitate
the communication process between the software developers and the other, potentially non-
technical, stakeholders of the project.
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4.2.1 Modeling
Modeling technology today is a key activity in virtually all information technology projects. In
the software development process modeling is used to separate the complexity that is imple-
mentation specific from inevitable business logic complexity. By being able to abstract from
complexity that arises during implementation, modeling helps to focus on and intellectually
penetrate the business logic at hand. This is precisely the intention in this work, in which the
graphical general-purpose modeling language Unified Modeling Language (UML) was used, to
help understand the domain of this work, cryptocurrencies.
4.2.2 Software engineering methods
Facing a real world problem that is supposed to be solved by a software-intensive system and
then just staring to write code is a strategy that might be successful for a real world problem that
can be tackled by software solutions of limited complexity, but big software-intensive systems
demand for another method. This is the reason why concise software engineering methods have
been defined, whereby such a method is considered being first and foremost an “organized and
systematic approach to developing software [..]” (quoted from Bourque & Fairley, 2014, pg.
9-7).
Method applied in this work There is no specific software development method rigorously
applied to the real-world problem that is at the centre of this work. However the heuristic
method applied is oriented on object-oriented analysis and design methods and was adapted to
domain specific needs. The models created are based on concepts of the UML the intent always
being to provide as much understanding of the domain as possible using these types of diagrams.
So, sometimes the models are not conforming to UML meta-models in their entirety (see for
example the nesting of systems in the diagram in figure 28 on page 63).
4.2.3 Modeling tools used in this work
For the creation of the UML models that are shown in this work the free and open-source
software UMLet was used.15
15see http://www.umlet.com/ - accessed July 1st 2014.
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5 Currency, money, payment systems
As mentioned in 1.2 the chief aim for this work is to find out if the cryptocurrency community
has indeed created a new kind of money. It seems obvious that certain basics on cryptography
need to be discussed in an introductory section in this work (see section 3). The same is true
for cryptocurrencies, employing cryptographic technologies in a new and potentially sweepingly
innovative way (see section 2). Also a very short introduction to software engineering, respec-
tively specific sub-areas that provide practices and concepts employed in this work, is given in
section 4. But also the terms currency, money and payment systems as concepts are suited to
get a section that sets the stage. Not because money as a technology is so new, but because we
want to start off this investigation as little as presumptuous as possible. First we want to inquire
modern macroeconomics what it has to say about money and the functions or requirements it
has to fulfil to be used as such.
5.1 Money
In mainstream macroeconomic textbooks, an example is Mankiw (2007) or Mankiw (2014),
another is Hicks (1967), money is explained by the functions it fulfils (see Mankiw, 2007, pg.
22f.). The functions referred to are in brief:
1. medium of exchange
2. unit of account
3. store of value
Having the research objective of this work in mind and looking at these functions it is tempting
to merely check if the Bitcoin system does indeed create something (bitcoins) that is used as a
‘medium of exchange’, as a ‘unit of account’ and as a ‘store of value’. Of course we would have
to elaborate on these three functions - we do this extensively in section 6 - but let’s assume for
sake of the current section that these functions were self explanatory. Our investigation could
already end right here and we would just state: “Well, if it was used in a way to fulfil these
functions, then it must be money.” Astonishingly, in a way, this is exactly the perspective that
is taken on bitcoin by some economists:
“Currency is any agreed upon means of exchanges of goods and services, so you could
have some small stones, as used in history, and if it’s accepted by a sufficiently large
population, then that’s enough [...]”16
The logic in this reasoning is simple and at first glance seems to be convincing: if it is “accepted
by a sufficiently large population”, then it is money. End of story. How a payment system would
have to be designed however for it to be used “by a sufficiently large population” is exactly what
is of interest to us in this work, the assumption here being that Bitcoin is currently not used
“by a sufficiently large population” as their money.
5.2 Currency
Since it is our goal to enquire if cryptocurrencies are “a new kind of money” we need to establish
an understanding of what a currency is. The term currency is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary
as follows:
16Paul Ehling, associate professor in the department of financial economics at the BI Norwegian Business
School - cited in ‘Bitcoins Fail Currency Test in Scandinavia’s Richest Nation’ - http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2013-12-12/bitcoins-fail-real-money-test-in-scandinavia-s-wealthiest-nation.html - ac-
cessed May 13th 2014.
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“Coined money and such banknotes or other paper money as are authorized by law
and do in fact circulate from hand to hand as the medium of exchange.”17
According to this definition there are two requirements to a currency.
1. Being authorized by law
2. Circulate form hand to hand as the medium of exchange
1. Legal tender The first requirement we consider to be fulfilled for what is called legal tender.
Legal tender laws define what has to be accepted in final settlement of debt, if it is offered as
payment.18 Legal tender laws do not force private businesses to accept the specified currency.19
To be precise and stick to the terms used in his work: legal tender laws do not force any private
party to offer their assets or services at a price that is specified in a certain money of account.
2. Being in circulation The second requirement might be reflected in the etymological origins
of the term ‘currency’ that roots in the Latin word ‘currens’ that is a reflection of ‘curró’, which
means ‘to run’.20 A currency is therefore characterized by the virtue of being ‘on the run’ in the
sense that it has the ability to change hands quickly - for purposes of payment - and does so
without discount. If we interpret this requirement as a shall requirement, then a currency that -
for whatever reason - loses its acceptance as a current means of payment without discount stops
being a currency.21
Summarizing definition If something is ‘currently’ used and accepted as money, it is a currency
within a jurisdiction, if this jurisdiction specified it as legal tender. This definition allows for
other monies to exist within the jurisdiction, but if only one money is defined as legal tender
within one jurisdiction, then there is only one currency.
‘Currency’ versus ‘money’ Following the definition above, money and currency are no syn-
onyms. An outright synonymous use therefore is strictly avoided in this work.22
Implications for the term ‘cryptocurrency’ Considering the definition of currency above, the
term cryptocurrency is interesting, since currently there are no central authorities declaring it as
legal tender in any jurisdiction. As long as no central government does declare a cryptocurrency
as legal tender, the term cryptocurrency might be considered misleading. Without being legal
tender a cryptocurrency can by definition be no currency. On the other hand it might be a
notion on the power of cryptography that might make it a currency in just another sense, which
17See: Griswold v. Hepburn, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 33; Leonard v. State, 115 Ala. SO, 22 South. 504; Insurance Co. v.
Keirou, 27 111. 505; Insurance Co. v. Ivupfer, 2S 111. 332, 81 Am. Dec. 284; Lackey v. Miller, 01 N. O. 20.
- http://thelawdictionary.org/letter/c/page/234/ - accessed July 4th 2014.
18An example for a legal tender law is to be found in the US Coinage Act of 1965, Section 31 U.S.C. 5103: “United
States coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and
national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues. Foreign gold or silver coins are
not legal tender for debts.” - http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/5103 - accessed July 5th 2014.
19“There is [...] no Federal statute mandating that a private business, a person or an organization must accept
currency or coins as for payment for goods and/or services.” - http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
faqs/currency/pages/legal-tender.aspx - accessed July 5th 2014.
20http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/currency - accessed July 4th 2014.
21This has happened in the past to currencies of certain nation states that had their cur-
rencies devalued or essentially destroyed, leading to restrictions in the use of foreign curren-
cies by ‘their’ citizens; lately seen in Argentina: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/24/
peso-collapse-argentina-economic-crisis-fernandez-de-kirchner - accessed July 8th 2014.
22As an example for synonymous use of these terms: the economist cited in 5.1, footnote 16 used currency and
money synonymously.
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brings us right back to the research question that motivated this work: are cryptocurrencies “a
new kind of money?”
5.3 Payment Systems
So far we have used the term payment system without a concise definition. This term is going
to be much used in this work, therefore we want to find a definition that is as unambiguous as
possible and suitable to the needs of this work. To find out what a payment system is, we first
need to establish an understanding of the process of payment.
A payment is the “delivery of money” As we did with the term currency, we want to consult
Black’s Law Dictionary to start our inquiry for a definition of the term payment:
“The performance of a duty, promise, or obligation, or discharge of a debt or lia-
bility, by the delivery of money or other value. Also the money or other thing so
delivered.”23
A “performance of a duty” or the “discharge of a debt” clearly implies (at least) two parties, a
creditor, who has a claim on a debtor, and a debtor, who is obliged to perform the duty towards
the creditor. Such a creditor-debtor relationship24 can, for example, be established by a loan
payment from a Creditor to a Debtor as is shown in figure 2.
loan payment DebtorCreditor
Figure 2: Creditor pays out loan to Debtor, thereby establishing a creditor-debtor relationship
that is shown in figure 3.
This is a good example to show that a payment can initiate a creditor-debtor relationship, in
this case, because by agreeing upon the terms of a credit agreement, the Creditor was obliged
to make the initial principal payment to the Debtor. So, again, the payment does discharge
the debt, even though after the initial payment from Creditor to Debtor, the creditor-debtor
relationship is just established (shown in figure 3). We are going to expand on credit agreements
in section 6.6, where we are showing the course of a credit agreement as an activity diagram in
figure 8 on page 32.
Figure 3 shows the ongoing relationships between Creditor and Debtor after they are estab-
lished, here, after the loan payment from Creditor to Debtor, but before the final payment from
Debtor to Creditor has happened.
claim on
in debt to DebtorCreditor
Figure 3: Established creditor-debtor relationship before payment.
23See: Brady v. Wasson, 6 Ileisk. (Tenn.) 135; Bloodworth v. Jacobs, 2 La. Ann. 24; Root v. Kelley, 39 Misc.
Rep. 530, 80 N. Y. Supp. 4S2 [...] - http://thelawdictionary.org/payment/ - accessed July 4th 2014.
24this is a term borrowed from terminology used by Heinsohn & Steiger (1996).
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The payment is the “delivery of money”, thereby discharging the debt. The circumstance
that the debt can be discharged by the payment, implies that the debt was established before
the payment is made. ‘Before’ can mean any time-frame including ‘immediately preceding’. The
“delivery of money” implies that some form of money is available. Figure 4 shows the payment
of principal + interest by the Debtor to the Creditor by transferring money. The payment is the
discharge of the debt, thereby ending this creditor-debtor relationship that is shown in figure 3.
prinipal + interestCreditor Debtor
Figure 4: Debtor pays principal + interest to Creditor using money, thereby discharging the
debt.
Money allows for payments to be made Following this understanding of a payment, it is clear
that there can be no “delivery of money” if there is not some form of money available. Money,
obviously plays a central role for the performance of payments.
A payment system facilitates payments A payment system, in this work, is any system that
facilitates payments for its users. As a first analysis, the users of a payment system can be of
two different types:
• Payer - the debtor uses the payment system as a payer to pay his creditor
• Payee - the creditor is receiving payments by the debtor through the payment system
We will expand upon the different types of users of a payment system in section 6.1, where an
object diagram on user types, exceeding payer and payee, is shown in figure 6.
Obviously single entity users can be creditors in one ongoing relationship and debtors in others
and even within one creditor-debtor relationship, the roles of payer and payee change back and
forth as is shown in figures 2 (Creditor is the payer, Debtor is the payee) and 4 (Debtor is the
payer and Creditor the payee). Concerning one single payment however the users are always
engaged as exactly one of the two types depicted: they are either the payer or they are the payee
in one single payment.
A payment system has to provide for a money To facilitate payments, a payment system
needs to provide its users (payers and payees) some form of money that allows them to perform
their payment transactions. Money is therefore a crucial issue for any payment system and any
model about payments or payment systems needs to find a systematic place for the money that
is delivered to perform payments. At this point we are not going into any more detail about
the specificity of the money that is being used, whether the payment system itself provides for
the money (endogenous money), or it uses some exogenous form of money, that is subsidized by
some other form of settlement, e.g. netting contracts (see Emmons, 1995, pg.13f.). But we have
to state that we need a theory that has a systematic place for money.
5.4 Synopsis on ‘money’
So far our understanding of money, following the views portrayed in 5.1 by mainstream
economists, is that money is whatever is used and accepted as such. To define money like
this makes a lot of sense in one way, but does not help us in another. In this work, we are
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interested in finding an answer to the question under which circumstances something would be
used and accepted as money or how a payment system would have to be designed to spawn “a
new kind of money”. To be able to do this, we want to try to further expand our toolbox of
monetary terms.
Currency and money The term currency as it is defined in 5.2 is different from money, in
the sense that a currency is backed by a central government through legal tender laws. This
definition allows for the existence and usage of monies other than what is defined as currency
by legal tender laws. The realization that money and currency are not the same, takes the
opportunity away to constrain money to only that what the government by legal tender laws
declared to be money.
Money that is not legal tender An example of a money that is widely used and accepted as
such are short term liabilities of commercial banks, we call bankmoney in this work. Bankmoney
is specifically not included in legal tender laws of central governments and are therefore not
currency, but they are used and accepted as money by virtually all economic entities, including
- at least in part - central governments themselves for example for the purpose of non-cash tax
payments.25 The way bankmoney is created is briefly discussed in section 8.
Non-acceptance of some currencies by their own population Furthermore if currency and
money were used synonymously, there was no way to explain how in certain cases the acceptance
and usage of the currency, i.e. what the government declared to be money, was rejected by the
population. In these cases the population insists on other monies, mostly foreign currencies. We
expand on this point in section 6.3.3.
Money at the heart of every payment system Concerning money - that is at the heart of
any payment system - it seems necessary to attempt a more thorough analysis that we pursue
throughout the ensuing section 6 by employing a requirements analysis approach for a payment
system and thereby introducing the concept of money of account and of money proper.
25Cf. e.g. “Pay by Check or Money Order” - http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Pay-by-Check-or-Money-Order
- accessed July 5th 2014.
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Three essential
functions of money:
1. medium of exchange
2. unit of account
3. store of value
These three functions are considered
essential functional requirements for
a payment system and result in the
corresponding use cases
Holding on
to money
Pricing
in money
Paying
with money
User
PaymentSystem
Figure 5: Use case diagram on the functional requirements for a payment system concerning
money.
6 Requirements analysis
In this section we do a requirements analysis for a yet to design - totally hypothetical and
software-intensive - payment system. It is a mock requirements analysis of course, since there
are no actual customers or stakeholders to be asked or interviewed in this work. We will be
focused here on functional requirements, even though usability, reliability and performance issues
certainly play a role for any payment system.
We do this functional requirements analysis keeping in mind that there is the predominantly
and currently used national and international payment system, based on nation states, central
and commercial banks on one hand, we call it the Banking Payment System (BPS), and on the
other hand is the newly created Cryptocurrency Payment System (CPS), that is the Bitcoin
project. The latter claiming to have created “a new kind of money” - ‘new’ of course relating to
the older, currently used BPS and its money.
We are doing a requirements analysis for a hypothetical payment system, with the aim to
clarify our view on money, money proper and money of account. The payment system we think
of is a software-intensive system, even though a payment system of a certain kind could provide
for banknotes to be passed on, which theoretically allows for payments to be performed without
any software support.
What requirements do exist for a successful payment system? A payment system facilitates
payments by providing its users with a money that can be delivered to perform payments. We
can therefore restate this question as: what is required to create something that is actually used
and accepted as money?
6.1 Basic functions of a payment system
We take the three functions of money that were mentioned in section 5.1 (medium of exchange,
unit of account and store of value) as a starting point for a requirements analysis. We consider
these three basic functions as requirements that have to be fulfilled for the payment system
to be applied as such by its users. If these three functional requirements are not fulfilled the
payment system would not have anything that could be called ‘money’ and it would not be
working properly for lack of usage and acceptance of its ‘money’. So these three basic functions
can be thought of as what would be shall requirements in a software project.
Figure 5 shows these coherences in a use case diagram for a payment system. For reasons of
simplicity the different types of users of a payment system are not shown in this diagram, they
are going to be covered in section 6.1.1.
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HoarderAdopterPayeePayer
User
Figure 6: Object diagram on the different user types of a payment system.
6.1.1 Users of a payment system
While we have mentioned two types of users of a payment system in section 5.3, we want to
explore the types in a bit more detail here. The four different types of users of a payment system
that are identified here, are shown in figure 6.
Payer A payer is involved in the use case of paying with money (6.1.2) and therefore produces
a set of requirements concerning the money of a payment system, since it is this money that is
being transferred from payer to payee by the payment system to discharge debt for the payer.
Payee A payee is involved in the use case of paying with money (6.1.2) and does produce a set
of requirements for the money of the hypothetical payment system we are analysing here.
Adopter An adopter is a term applied to the type of user of the payment system that adopts
the money to price his assets, goods and services in it. The adopter therefore is involved in the
use case of pricing in money (6.1.3).
Hoarder A hoarder wants to hold on to money now to spend it at a later point in time. The
hoarder is involved in the use case of holding on to money (6.1.4) and has therefore certain
demands to the payment system’s money to enable this use case.
‘Pricing in’ and ‘paying with’ It is worthwhile to note already at this point that money is used
here with different prepositions that are indicating distinct functions of money. While ‘paying
with’ and ‘holding on to’ indicates an instrumental use of something that can be transferred
or that can be held on to. ‘Pricing in’ on the other hand certainly does not refer to a thing.
In section 6.2, about money as the ‘medium of exchange’, we will develop the idea of a money
proper, which is the form of money that can be thought of as something that is changing
hands, even though the actual ‘thing’ that is changing hands can be immaterial, like an entry
in bookkeeping records. The notion of a money of account that reliably allows the nomination
of contracts and to set prices for asset, goods and services, is described in section 6.3, where we
analyse the money function of being a ‘unit of account’.
6.1.2 Use case: Paying with money
To add more substance to the use cases we depicted in the use case diagram in figure 5 we
want to write out fully dressed use cases based on the suggestions made by Cockburn (2004)
concerning the writing of effective use cases. What we are calling ‘Extensions’ here, certainly
could be expanded upon by ‘Exceptions’ and ‘Variation Scenarios’ as is suggested by Alexander
& Beus-Dukic (2009) for systems in general. We will stick to the software modeling view here.
Scope Payment System
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Level User Goal
Primary Actor Payer and Payee
Stakeholders and Interests
1. Payer
a) wants his funds to be secure
b) wants to be able to safely and quickly transfer his funds anytime, anywhere in any
amount available
2. Payee
a) wants his funds to be secure
b) wants to be able to safely and quickly receive funds anytime, anywhere in any amount
sent to him
Preconditions
* Payment System is available and provides for a money that can be sent to fulfil payments
1. Payer
a) has sufficient funds to make the payment
b) has sufficient information about Payee
2. Payee
a) is reachable for Payer by means of the payment system
Postconditions
1. Payer
a) has transferred funds removed from his account or transferred funds are not accessible
any more
2. Payee
a) received transferred funds on his account or is able to access transferred funds
Main Success Scenario
1. Payer inputs all data necessary into the payment system interface and confirms entry
2. Payment system processes order
3. Payee has transferred funds at his disposal
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Extensions
1. Payer
a) does not have all data necessary about payee
i. acquire data about payee and retry payment
or
ii. end payment
b) does not have sufficient funds
i. Payment is declined for lack of funds
ii. end payment
2. Payment System
a) is not available
b) send status message about unavailability to maintenance service
c) maintenance brings payment system back on-line
d) publish payment system availability to users
3. Payee
a) did not receive the funds or does not have access to them
b) induces correction measures towards the payment system
Paying with money In section 6.2, we analyse in more depth what type of money is needed
for the design of a payment system that makes this use case available for its users.
6.1.3 Use case: Pricing in money
Scope Payment System
Level User Goal
Primary Actor Adopter
Stakeholders and Interests
1. Adopter
Preconditions
1. Payment System provides a unit
Postconditions
Main Success Scenario
1. Adopter uses unit of the payment system
2. Pricing of assets, goods and services, as well as nomination of contracts in unit
3. contracts are successfully fulfilled
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Extensions
3. a) Contractual nuisances happen, e.g. payment does not happen afterwards
b) Adopter needs to seek remedy, e.g. legal remedies with third party intervener (i.e.
governmental agency)
Pricing in money The use case just outlined might look trivial at very first glance, however
Extension 3. makes it clear that there is a third party intervener needed, or rather an infras-
tructure that the payment system is embedded in, to ensure adopters of the money that their
contracts nominated in the money (actually it is the money of account, as will be explained in
6.3) are going to be fulfilled by the second party to the contract. This infrastructure is going to
be named the Money Meta Infrastructure and is going to be explored in section 6.6.
6.1.4 Use case: Holding on to money
Scope Payment System
Level User Goal
Primary Actor Hoarder
Stakeholders and Interests
1. Hoarder
a) wants to hold on to money
b) does not want his money to lose value significantly
c) wants to spend money at a later point in time or stash it away for deliberations on
liquidity and security
Preconditions
1. hoardable money is provided by the payment system
Postconditions
1. Hoarder has money at his disposal that he can make payments with at any time
Main Success Scenario
1. Hoarder holds on to money for as long as he wants
2. Hoarder spends money at a later point in time
Holding on to money This use case is going to be further explored in section 6.4, where we
inquire the function of money called ‘Store of value’. It is going to be revealed that this use case
cannot be available if the requirements for the other two use cases, ‘paying with money’ and
‘pricing in money’ are not fulfilled. This is going to be explained in section 6.5 on the hierarchy
of requirements.
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6.2 Medium of exchange
As one of the three essential functions of money, as for example proposed by (Mankiw, 2007, pg.
22f.), money needs to serve as a ‘medium of exchange’. If we think of money just as a medium
of exchange, it is tempting to view money as a mere transitory item, in the sense that it is not
the earnings of money that is the target of a sale, but the real target is the next item’s purchase
that is afterwards paid with the money acquired by the previous sale. We want to use a very
simple model to first depict a so called barter trade and then adding more detail to this bartering
process by including money, thereby making money conceptually accessible to our inquiry.
6.2.1 Barter exchange
Karl Menger26 views man as trying to improve his current situation by way of exchanging his
assets or services for others he prefers. Menger writes:
“[E]ach man is intent to get by way of exchange just such goods as he directly needs,
and to reject those of which he has no need at all, or with which he is already
sufficiently provided.” (Menger, 1892, pg. 242)
With A representing an asset, a barter exchange of two assets could be symbolized as
A1 −A2. (1)
In this barter exchange there is - at first - no need for any money.
6.2.2 Money - facilitating barter trades
The idea of man trying to improve his situation by way of exchange is an old one, but is still
considered relevant for monetary theory, because an actual barter trade is considered a highly
unlikely transaction for the reason of “the double coincidence necessary to an act of barter” (see
Jevons, 1875, Chap I par 6).27 Or as Menger puts it:
“Consider how seldom it is the case that a commodity owned by somebody is of less
value in use than another commodity owned by somebody else! And for the latter
just the opposite relation is the case. But how much more seldom does it happen
that these two bodies meet!” (Menger, 1892, pg. 242)
Money alleviates this double coincidence, therefore money is considered a facilitator of these
kinds of barter trades by reducing transaction costs. (see Brunner & Meltzer, 1971, pg. 786ff.)
Money in this view is merely seen as a means to an end, the end being the sale of the asset
A1 and finally the acquisition of another asset A2. Money however does not play a role itself in
this view, it is merely facilitating a barter trade. The bartering being the exchange of A2 for A1
and vice versa. If there was no money at all, then it would be an actual barter trade.
26Menger is mentioned here as just one of many classical, neoclassical or Austrian - referring to the Austrian
school of economic thought - economists that could be cited here, including Adam Smith, Leon Walras, F. A.
von Hayek et al.
27There is no need to have two distinct goods to show the lacking double coincidence of wants. Having one good
to barter between two parties is sufficient to show that there is a problem with bartering in itself that can only
be overcome by a recognized and used medium of bookkeeping (i.e. money of account and credit nominated
therein), as is shown by Ostroy & Starr (1988).
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6.2.3 Lifting the veil of barter
If we model the process that was shown in model 1 with a little more detail, we insert the so
called ‘medium of exchange’ money, symbolized by M .
A1 −M −A2 (2)
For being able to look at the actual process in even more detail, we want to split this process in
the subprocess of ‘Paying’
M −A2 (3)
in which the holder of M transfers M to the owner of A2 and therefore becomes the new owner
of A2, and the subprocess of ‘Being paid’
A1 −M (4)
in which the initial owner of A1 releases A1 to the holder of M and in turn gets M . Obviously
these two subprocesses are effectively identical and could be viewed vice versa as well. We
want to emphasize however that there is an actual process of buying and paying happening that
sometimes does get lost, if we think of money as a mere facilitator of barter trades. Since we are
interested in this work in payment systems we have to look at these processes in detail, thereby
making money visible. We cannot afford to gloss over these processes by the ‘veil of barter’ (see
Heinsohn & Steiger, 1989), because we would be losing track of the money in doing so.
6.2.4 Final settlement of debt
While the notion of money being a ‘medium of exchange’ seems to be predominant in the
more recent literature, we prefer the term ‘means of payment’ by Hicks, since this term
accounts for the process of payment that is behind every perceived ‘barter’ transaction (see
Hicks, 1967, pg. 1). In section 5.3 we concluded that a payment is the “delivery of money”
thereby “discharging the debt”. In other words money has to fulfil the requirement of being the
means of final settlement of debt.
6.2.5 Money proper
In conclusion of this section on the requirement called ‘medium of exchange’, we want to empha-
size here that ultimately money is not only a medium of exchange, but it is the means of final
settlement of debts. This may sound trivial, yet it is important enough to mention specifically:
it is the ability to provide final settlement of debts that a payment system has to be able to
provide for being a payment system after all. This aspect of money that is being a means of final
settlement of debt without discount is what we call ‘money proper’ in this work.28 We consider
the yielding of a money proper an emergent property of a well functioning payment system.
6.3 Unit of account
The function of money as a unit of account comprises the usage as a unit to price assets and
services, to define contracts and to make calculations (see Mankiw, 2014, pg. 323). In this
section we are going to explore under what circumstances a unit of account is actually used and
therefore becomes a money of account, thereby fulfilling this functional requirement for money.
28While ‘money proper’ was used by J.M. Keynes in another context - he used the term to differentiate government
backed ‘proper money’ from ‘bank money’ - we are using the term money proper for the purpose of this work
synonymous to what is accepted without discount as the actual means of payment.
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6.3.1 Pricing is voluntary
In short one could argue: money is used as a unit of account if households, organizations and
businesses typically have the prices of assets and for goods and services denominated in this
unit. As was mentioned in footnote 19 even for currencies that are monies backed by legal
tender laws of central governments, it is not mandatory for private households or businesses to
price their assets in the corresponding money of account of the currency. If the right amount
of money proper of a currency - that by definition is declared as legal tender - is offered to a
creditor as a means of payment, the debt is considered to be discharged. This assertion by a
central government does mean that debts, already established and nominated in the money of
account of the currency, are legally discharged if the money proper of the currency was offered
as payment. The assertion does not mean that private households, organisations or businesses
are obliged to offer their assets in prices nominated in the money of account or use the money
proper of the currency. Choosing a certain money of account for the pricing of an asset is a
voluntarily made decision, albeit a momentous one, as we shall see.
6.3.2 Choosing a unit of account
The circumstances that are necessary to motivate economic units to actually do positively decide
to use a certain unit as their unit of account are not obvious and have to be investigated. We
could cut this inspection short, by simply stating: if the government says it’s money, it has to
be used as such. But we now know this isn’t even true for currencies, since legal tender laws
only require acceptance of a certain money proper as means of final settlement of debt, if a debt
is due that was established using the corresponding money of account. The use of the money
of account however is voluntary, as we have just seen in 6.3.1. This limited view is especially
useless for our discussion revolving around cryptocurrencies that - at least so far - have not been
declared legal tender anywhere by any government. In the following we are going to explore
potential motivations for users to voluntarily use a certain unit of account as their money of
account.
6.3.3 Potential motivations to choose a unit
It seems reasonable to assume that a certain stability in the price level is necessary for a business
to be motivated to price its assets in a certain unit of account for it is not only laborious to reprice
its assets continually but it is also a price risk that the business has to account for. Especially
if it has negative cash flow from costs that are to be paid in a different unit of account, every
argument concerning the hedging of foreign currency risk for businesses applies here as well.
An example would be a business that has to make the decision to price its assets in bitcoin
or not. If the business does have costs that are to be paid in some other currency, e.g. EUR
or USD, a high volatility in bitcoin prices is a foreign currency risk for this business and can
therefore inhibit
It further seems to be a great motivation for a business to use a certain unit of account, if
their own costs, at least significant parts, are to be covered with money proper of said unit. This
is an important issue for us in this work, since bitcoin is still rarely used as the unit of account
by businesses and it is also true that there is not a lot of costs to be paid that are nominated
in bitcoin as the money of account. For example neither electricity costs can be covered by
transferring bitcoins to a utility company nor are any salaries paid in bitcoins.29
A much cited mainstream economist is Nicholas Gregory Mankiw, who wrote in 2014 about
the acceptance of fiat money:
29Notably bitcoins are created as outside money without the need for a debtor to pay back principal and interest
from day one. Like electricity costs and salaries, interest and principal payments are very relevant costs for
businesses. This might be a mere correlation, but it is a notable one that demands further investigation.
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“To a large extent, the acceptance of fiat money depends as much on expectations and
social convention as on government decree. The Soviet government in the 1980s never
abandoned the ruble as the official currency. Yet the people of Moscow preferred
to accept cigarettes (or even American dollars) in exchange for goods and services
because they were more confident that these alternative monies would be accepted
by others in the future.” (Mankiw, 2014, pg. 324)
An explaining example for fiat money that Mankiw talks about here, is the proverbial paper
note that has no value as a physical thing, except that of a piece of paper. In the way that it has
no intrinsic value per se the money proper of Bitcoin is certainly fiat money, too. However it is
a term used to indicate that the money is backed by government decree, meaning legal tender
laws, and therefore stands in this context for what we call currency in this work. While it may
have no value as a mere physical thing, fiat money certainly does have value as money if it is
used and accepted as such. Again the issue arises under what circumstances a money is used
and accepted.
Concerning this matter Mankiw mentions ‘expectations’ and ‘social conventions’ that usually
impart ‘value’30 to a money. According to Mankiw these mechanisms seem to have failed for the
example that is given in the Russian ruble. The Soviet government may have issued legal tender
laws at the time, but people did not want to use the ruble as their unit of account any more for
lack of ‘expectations’ and ‘social conventions’, if we follow Mankiw’s terminology here. We want
to look at these ‘expectations’ and ‘social conventions’ in more detail to further comprehend
this functional requirement for money called ‘unit of account’.
6.3.4 Specification of contracts
The tagging of assets, goods or services with a price in a certain unit of account is nothing else
than an offer to sell the asset to a willing buyer. It is one side of a purchase agreement that
already stands there for any willing buyer to complete it. A purchase agreement is a contract
that involves a unit of account that is necessary for the contract’s specification. This is also true
for credit agreements.
6.3.5 Credit agreements
Credit agreements are another type of contract that require a unit of account to enable the
contracts definition. Or looking at it from the other angle: if a unit of account is proposed and
it is not used in credit contracts, it does not work properly as a unit of account and therefore is
no money of account. Certain requirements have to be fulfilled for a unit of account to be used
in credit contracts.
Creditors engage in credit agreements only under certain premises regarding the infrastruc-
ture that is set up around the unit of account. To delineate these requirements in detail would
certainly exceed the scope of this work. However it is worthwhile to note that without certain
specifics in the legal, civil and fiscal infrastructure the use of a unit of account in credit agree-
ments would have to be declined by creditors due to risk considerations. We want to give one
example that is very significant for cryptocurrencies: if a creditor has no means to effectively
insist on contract settlement, by means of enforcement measures including eventual debt collec-
tion, then he just simply cannot engage in any credit agreement with any debtor for the reason
that the debtor could potentially just refuse to bay back the loan and the creditor would be
powerless to do anything about that.
30In the money context having value essentially means for the money to be used and accepted as such. To be
precise: it means the usage of the money of account to specify contracts and the acceptance of the money
proper as a means of payment without discount.
27
6.4 Store of value 6 REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
6.3.6 Discovering the Money Meta Infrastructure
For a business to be able to enforce any contract (including credit agreements) or to initiate debt
collection against non-performing debtors, it has to rely on a legal, civil and fiscal infrastructure
that we will call the Money Meta Infrastructure (MMI). Without a properly working MMI,
creditors have no means to enforce contracts and are therefore powerless against non-performing
debtors. It is this powerlessness that would have to lead to creditors not want to become creditors
in the first place, thereby totally inhibiting any financing activities. Without credit contracts,
there can be no financing of anything and arguably, without financing there is not going to be
much of an economy. Since without a proper MMI not many creditors are going to be willing
to engage in credit contracts, a proper MMI can be considered a prerequisite for any economic
activity. It certainly is a requirement for a functioning money of account. Even though default
on contracts, as it was described here, is assumed to never occur in most formal macroeconomic
models, by way of the implicit assumption of ‘transversality’, according to Goodhart, for the
assessment we are trying to do in this work we do not have this luxury (see Goodhart, 2008,
pg. 213). Defaults on contracts can and do happen in the real world, and will happen in the
world of cryptocurrencies. This simple fact needs to be taken into account in an assessment of
cryptocurrencies as a money of account, which is what we try to do by taking the MMI into
consideration here.
6.3.7 Money of account
The requirement for money to be used as a unit of account depends on certain prerequisites that
evolve around contracts and their enforcement or finally even the initiation of debt-collection
against non-performing debtors. A payment system that is embedded within an infrastructure
that provides for all the necessary requirements and therefore allows for the effective use of its
money as a unit of account, such a payment system we consider to provide its users with a
money of account. We use the term money of account if we are talking about a unit of account
that fulfils all the requirements to be used as such, especially the embeddedness within a MMI.
6.4 Store of value
The type of users that want to store value in the money proper of a payment system, is called
hoarder. They are not engaged in performing payments right now, but they expect to be able to
fulfil payments with the money at a later stage and are therefore holding on to or hoarding it.
This implies that the two preceding functions of money - serving as money proper (explained
in 6.2) and as money of account (explained in 6.3) - are expected by the hoarder to be fulfilled at
the future point in time. This is effectively an expectation about future liquidity of the money
that is stored. To clarify this function of money we want to take a look at assets in general that
can potentially serve as a store of value.
6.4.1 Funding liquidity
Having the sufficient amount of money proper at the needed point in time is being liquid.
Mehrling calls this type of liquidity funding liquidity (see Mehrling, 2010, pg. 68). It is the
ability to make payments, when they are due, or to be able to pay somebody else to make them.
The latter is also called the rolling over of debt (cf. Abel, 1992, pg. 4).
6.4.2 Market liquidity
Any asset can be used as a store of value, but assets are different in their market liquidity and
therefore differ in their function as a store of value. The market liquidity of an asset is high,
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if the holder of the asset is able to sell it quickly and thereby does not cause any substantial
change in the price of the asset.
The asset with the highest imaginable market liquidity can be sold immediately at (virtually)
infinitely high amounts, without changing the price of the asset. This asset is called money.
6.4.3 No new requirements
Important to note here is: if a money does fulfil all the requirements for being used as a money
of account and being accepted as a money proper, there is little worry that the money will not
also be used as a store of value for lack of liquidity or any other reason by hoarders that want
to do so. This insight has the effect that no additional requirements for money originate solely
from the functional requirement posed to money to have to serve as a ‘store of value’ for its
users. This realization brings us to the hierarchy of functional requirements for money.
6.5 Hierarchy of requirements
We want to make the argument here that the three basic functions of money or requirements have
hierarchical relationships. These relationships further explain the requirements for a smoothly
running payment system, with the requirement that demands yielding of a used money of account
being the most important requirement.
6.5.1 Pricing first, then payments
As explained in 6.3 the requirement for a money to work properly as a money of account leads
to private households, organizations and businesses to voluntarily price their assets and services
in said money of account. This pricing clearly has to happen before anyone can pay for assets
and services with the corresponding money proper. This perspective emphasizes the importance
to model the process of money as a ‘medium of exchange’ in enough detail to comprehend that
what looks like a simple exchange of assets is a more complex process that involves payment.
The payment in turn requires a pricing a priori. If there is no price nominated in a certain
money of account, there can be no payment with the appropriate money proper. Or to put it
in another way: if a seller does not offer his product at a price nominated in, say US dollars,
then a purchaser will not be able to purchase the product using US dollars. It’s as simple as
that, but with non-trivial consequences for the hierarchy of requirements for a payment system,
making the general acceptance of a money proper dependent upon the widespread, voluntary
use of the money of account.
6.5.2 Hoarding the money proper
The function to store value means effectively the withholding of payments now, to rather make
payments later. We called this process the ‘hoarding’ of money proper in 6.4. However, if
nobody would ever price any assets and services in a certain money of account, then saving or
hoarding the money for later spending becomes irrelevant, since payments are impossible for
lack of a price on any asset or service in said money of account. As an example may serve any
bill, denominated in a today’s defunct currency (e.g. bills of the Rentenmark of Germany) that
was hoarded at the time with the intent to spend later. For lack of prices in the defunct currency
the attempt to spend the bill has to fail.
6.5.3 Conclusion on the hierarchy
If there are no prices in the money of account first, then there will be nothing to pay for with
the money proper, neither now nor later. If there is no money proper to hold on to, then the
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Figure 7: Domain model on the hierarchy of functional requirements concerning money.
function to be a store of value cannot be fulfilled. It is therefore fair to say the requirement that
leads to a used money of account is hierarchically superior to the other two basic requirements
for a payment system of yielding a money proper and a store of value. Figure 7 is representing
these relationships in a domain model. It is also shown that we consider the money of account
and the money proper as not only as some functional requirement but as emergent properties
for the money of a payment system. A very important role plays the so far just very briefly
described MMI that we want to enquire further in 6.6.
6.5.4 Relevance for Bitcoin
This is highly relevant for the evaluation of Bitcoin as a payment system - generically we call this
a CPS - since right now the pricing of assets and services by private households and businesses
alike using bitcoin as their sole money of account, is not common. Even if a business starts to
price their services in bitcoin - as lately did Expedia, Inc. - it does so in a limited fashion and is
emphasizing its unwillingness to hold bitcoin for issues of price risk that they cannot afford to
(or are unwilling to) bear.31 This is an issue that needs further inquiry. Could it be possible that
Bitcoin has a - potentially - ideal money proper and store of value, but lacks the requirement of
having a used money of account for the reason of deficiencies in the MMI?
6.6 Money Meta Infrastructure
Money Meta Infrastructure (MMI) is a term given to all institutions, agencies and organiza-
tions that, as an entirety, provide processes that are supporting all kinds of services concerning
property, contracts and money, including the potential enforcement of voluntarily engaged in
contracts of various kinds against non-performing parties to these contracts.
6.6.1 Central hypothesis
The central hypothesis of this section is that without a properly working MMI creditors would
not engage in credit agreements or similar contracts for reasons of risk avoidance. A potential
creditor that has no means to insist on the fulfilment of obligations by potential debtors is not
going to engage in the business of credit agreements in the first place. Ideally the means are so
powerful and prevalent that creditors and debtors are totally aware of those means in a way that
does not even make the deployment of those means necessary in a majority of cases. Within
31‘Expedia to accept Bitcoin payments for hotel bookings’ - http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-27810008 -
accessed June 27th 2014.
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nation states the MMI is realized by agencies like the land register and executive institutions
like bailiffs or the police.
6.6.2 Credit agreements
To substantiate the central hypothesis of this section confer figure 8, which contains an activity
diagram showing the activities within a creditor-debtor relationship during the course of a credit
agreement. In this simple case the relationship starts with the credit agreement as a contract
that is agreed upon by two independent parties (Creditor and Debtor) voluntarily. A possible
main success scenario for the activity of lending is listed below.
Main Success Scenario
1. Creditor and Debtor agree on terms of a credit agreement
2. Creditor pays out principal
3. Debtor pays principal and interest while these payments are due
4. Creditor received all principal and interest payments
5. Credit agreement is terminated
However we cannot just assume for every credit agreement to always be running smoothly and
be terminated successfully every single time. For a multitude of reasons - that cannot be elicited
exhaustively at this point - credit agreements can be willingly or unwillingly breached just as
any contract can be. A contractual relationship may be breached in the sense that at least one
party is unhappy with the performance of another party of the contract, because the party did
not stick to the agreements or at least it is perceived as such by the opposing party. This is
accounted for in figure 8 by displaying the option for the Creditor to initiate remedies, if the
Debtor fails to perform according to his obligations.
The main success scenario for a credit agreement that is depicted above, does have extensions
that have to be accounted for by the system. While figure 8 does not account for the Debtor
being unhappy with the performance of the Creditor. This case is also accounted for in the list
of extensions below.
Extensions
* at any time
a) Creditor is unhappy with performance of Debtor and seeks remedies as listed under
3.
b) Debtor is unhappy with performance of Creditor and seeks remedies as listed under
2.
2. Creditor is unwilling or incapable of paying out the full principal amount
a) Debtor is unhappy with performance of Creditor
b) Debtor seeks remedy for his situation
i. Debtor may inform regulatory agencies about Creditor performance
A. Regulatory agencies decide to intervene
B. Creditor performs as was agreed upon
C. Credit agreement continues
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Figure 8: Activity diagram on a real world credit agreement.
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or
A. Regulatory agencies decide not to intervene
B. Creditor does not perform as was agreed upon
C. Debtor might withhold own payments of principal and interest and is going
to seek further remedy, e.g. by suing the Creditor which will lead to further
extensions
ii. Remedies for Debtor are exhausted
iii. Creditor and Debtor come to new agreement
A. Credit agreement continues
or
B. Credit agreement is terminated and Debtor is compensated
3. Debtor is unwilling or incapable of performing principal and interest payments when they
are due
a) Creditor is unhappy with performance of Debtor
b) Creditor seeks remedy for his situation by renegotiation
i. Creditor and Debtor successfully renegotiate
ii. Credit agreement continues under new terms and conditions
or
i. Creditor and Debtor do not successfully renegotiate
ii. Creditor seeks further remedies
A. Creditor initiates foreclosure measures
B. Debtor is foreclosed upon by executive agencies
C. Credit Agreement is terminated
D. Creditor is compensated by funds out of foreclosure measures (e.g. sale of
pledged property)
c) Remedies are exhausted for Creditor
The studying of the extensions listed under 2. and 3. makes clear that in case of any breach
of contract the party that is harmed by the infringement does eventually have to look to third
party intervention for remedy. Especially in the case of the non-performing Debtor under 3. the
Creditor has to rely upon third party intervention in the form of executive agencies that perform
the foreclosure measures and an eventual sale of the property that was initially pledged by the
Debtor as part of the credit agreement.
6.6.3 Interim Conclusion
The third party intervention in case of breach of contract and the pledging of property as
collateral by a debtor is considered as being part of what we call the MMI in this work. Without
this MMI a creditor is put at high risk to lose his stake, if the debtor is not willing or unable
to perform his duties according to the terms of the credit agreement. A properly working and
available MMI is a key requirement for a payment system to be able to yield a widely used
money of account.
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6.6.4 Relevance for Bitcoin
We deem these reflections on the MMI as highly relevant for the research objective of this work,
which is to find out if Bitcoin created “a new kind of money”. If Bitcoin, as a payment system,
is not embedded in some form of MMI (or does provide for the requirements in some form), its
users are probably mostly unwilling to use its unit of account as a money of account to price
their assets, goods and services in it, for reasons of risk considerations. To evaluate, if Bitcoin
does account for these requirements that are posed to a payment system we now have to look
at Bitcoin and its proposed money of account and money proper called ‘bitcoin’ in more detail.
6.7 Synopsis
Since this section is on one hand rather expansive on the other potentially not even detailed
enough we want to try to recap the key insights of it here by showing the progression of un-
derstanding as the progression of the design of a use case diagram. The use case diagram we
started this section on is shown again in figure 9, stripped of any comments.
User Holding on
to money
Pricing
in money
Paying
with money
Payment System
Figure 9: This is the use case diagram on the functional requirements for a payment system that
we started this section with.
Including understanding of money If we add the understanding about money, the money
proper and the money of account gained in this section to the detail of the use case diagram in
figure 9, we receive the rather still unspectacular use case diagram shown in figure 10 below.
Holding on to
money proper
Pricing in
money of account
Paying with
money proper
User
Payment System
Figure 10: This is the use case diagram on the functional requirements for a payment system
that is depicted with additional precision on money that was gained in this section
It seems like a negligible detail, but it will render very useful for our further inquiry of Bitcoin,
to carefully distinguish the money proper, which is the means to effectuate the final settlement
of debt by transferring it, from the money of account, which is the unit that contracts and prices
are nominated in. This differentiation will allow for a much more precise analysis as just simply
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talking about money without clearly noting if the money proper or the money of account is
actually meant.
Including the hierarchy The next step was to get an understanding of the hierarchy on the
functional requirements. If we take the findings on the hierarchy on requirements from section
6.5 into account, the use case diagram in figure 11 is the result.
‘Holding on to money proper’ includes ‘Paying with money proper’ As it is shown by the
dependency relationships marked with «include», ‘Holding on to money proper ’ is possible only,
if a money proper does exist for a user to hold on to. A potential medium of exchange in turn is
a money proper only, if it is actually accepted as the means of final settlement of debt without
discount, which means nothing else but users being able to successfully ‘pay with money proper ’.
‘Paying with money proper’ includes ‘Pricing in money of account’ If a user of any payment
system does have a proposed money proper in his hands, but there is nowhere any price tag to
be found that is nominated in the corresponding money of account, the money proper he holds
in his hands will be useless.
This is very blatantly visible in the case of a CPS. If a Bitcoin user holds on to the money
proper called bitcoin, but there is nowhere anybody to be found that has put a price tag
nominated in the money of account (called bitcoin, too!32), then this user will have to hold on
to his bitcoins for he will not be able to perform any payments.
User Holding on to
money proper
Pricing in
money of account
Paying with
money proper
«include»
«include»
Payment System
Figure 11: This is the use case diagram on the functional requirements for a payment system
with additional detail on the hierarchy.
Including the Money Meta Infrastructure Finally, following advice from Cockburn (2004),
to try to identify actual supporting users from stakeholders, the MMI is added to the use
case diagram as a supporting (or secondary) user, providing services to the payment system as
described in section 6.6.
Again a rather insignificantly looking change in detail, depicted in figure 12 on page 36. Yet
the identification and inclusion of the MMI as a significant supporting agent of a payment system
will render useful in the analysis of the Bitcoin project as a CPS, for it is not self-evident that
the Bitcoin EcoSystem does provide for a MMI that offers all the services that the MMI of the
BPS does (and does so mostly unnoticed by users of the BPS and economists alike).33
32Eventually a useful distinction of money proper and money of account in the world of Bitcoin should be estab-
lished. For example by agreeing to a convention in calling the money proper ‘bitcoin’ and the corresponding
money of account either ‘BTC’ or maybe even ‘XBT’.
33The author of the work at hand owes a great amount of insights revolving around the MMI, without having it
identified as such at the time, to Theil (2000) and Theil (2001) and ensuing discussions with Wolfgang Theil.
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User MMIHolding on to
money proper
Pricing in
money of account
Paying with
money proper
«include»
«include»
Payment System
Figure 12: Use case diagram on the functional requirements for a payment system that has the
MMI included as a supporting user.
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7 Bitcoin
We will start this section with an attempted answer to the question what a bitcoin actually is,
thereby introducing certain fundamental principles of cryptocurrencies that we will subsequently
expand upon in section 7.2. The intent is to lay a thorough foundation of our understanding of
cryptocurrencies in general.
In section 7.3 we will focus on the actual process of using Bitcoin as a payment system, looking
in detail into the processing of payments within the Network. In this way Bitcoin is going to
serve as an example for a CPS.
We are also going to explore other potential capabilities of the Bitcoin Network that exceed
those of a mere payment system. Being embedded in what we call a MMI has been deemed an
indispensable requirement for a payment system (see section 6.6). By decentralized measures
Bitcoin might potentially provide for these requirements - or at least parts of them - that are
accounted for by infrastructure provided by agencies of central governments for the competing
BPS. This analysis is done in section 7.5.
7.1 Introducing the ‘coin’
Right upfront we want to attempt to answer the question what a bitcoin is. In this attempt we
will have to introduce certain key concepts concerning cryptocurrencies that we will subsequently
expand upon.
A chain of digital signatures Simply going by the name - bitcoins - one might tend to expect
there to be some sort of coin, a thing or a token that is one bitcoin. This imagination can be
very misleading, however if we follow the inventor of Bitcoin, there is indeed a sort-of ‘coin’
identifiable.
A ‘coin’ defined Nakamoto defines a ‘coin’ as “a chain of digital signatures” (see Nakamoto,
2008, pg. 2). The ‘coin’ therefore changing hands by being digitally signed over from one owner
to the next by including the next owner’s public key into the signed transaction. This process
makes use of a digital signature algorithm, which were conceptually described in section 3.4.
Transferring a ‘coin’ by example Let’s assume Alice wants to hand over a ‘coin’ of this fashion
to Bob. She can do so by digitally signing a section of data that we will call a transaction in
this work. Into the digital signature on transaction TA_2 Alice will include a reference to
transaction TA_1 that transferred the ‘coin’ to her beforehand, in the form of a hash of TA_1,
thereby creating a chain of transactions. Bob then passes the ‘coin’ on to Carol, by signing
transaction TA_3, again including a public key of Carol and the reference to TA_2 as a hash of
TA_2. Bob can only validly sign the ‘coin’ over to Carol (or anyone for that matter), because
he controls the private key that matches the public key included by Alice into her signature in
the transaction TA_2 from Alice to Bob.
We are illustrating this process in figure 13, which is entirely based on an illustration of
Nakamoto (see Nakamoto, 2008, pg. 2) with explaining comments added in.
Double-spending suspicions Carol, who received the ‘coin’ from Bob, by TA_3, can so far
only be sure that Bob was indeed allowed to pass the ‘coin’ on. He must have been entitled
to pass on the ‘coin’, because his public key was included by Alice in TA_2 from her to Bob.
But Carol cannot be sure if Bob did not also sign the ‘coin’ over to Dave by creating another
transaction TA_3’ and including Dave’s public key into this transaction and thereby double-
spending the ‘coin’. We will expand on double-spending later, when we are talking about the
intentional ‘forking of the blockchain’ on page 44.
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Bob digitally signs TA_3
in a way that makes the
coin available for Carol
The valid spending of the coin
by Alice with TA_2 can be verified
by comparing Alice's public key, 
with the signature, that could only
be created accordingly if Alice's
private key was used
Alice digitally signs TA_2:
- including the hash of TA_1, which formerly made the
coin available for her
- and Bob's public key, so that later only he can spend
the coin in a payment to Carol by TA_3
This chain of transactions is not to
be confused with the blockchain
If these transactions were actual Bitcoin
transactions they would each be part of 
different blocks
Carol's
private key
Bob's
signaturesign
verify
Bob's
private key
Previous owner's
signature sign
verify Alice's
signature
Carol's
public key
hash
Alice's
private key
Alice's
public key
hash
Bob's
public key
hash
TA_3:TransactionTA_2:TransactionTA_1:Transaction
Figure 13: Diagram showing a coin, as a chain of digital signatures, passing on from Alice to
Bob and from Bob to Carol.
No central authority One possible solution for Carol’s dilemma of her double-spending suspi-
cions of Bob, is to insist that a trusted central authority validates all transactions. Only if the
trusted third party confirms that Bob did not double spend the ‘coin’ and the transaction was
valid, Carol would accept to be the real and confirmed owner of the ‘coin’.
The solution of one central third party that is trusted by all participants - often called a ‘mint’
- has been tried before, but Nakamoto justifiably notes on the merit of this proposal:
“The problem with this solution is that the fate of the entire money system depends
on the company running the mint, with every transaction having to go through them,
just like a bank.” (Nakamoto, 2008, pg. 2)
The central question for any digital cash scheme using ‘coins’ of any kind is:
How can double-spending be prevented?
It is this central question that cryptocurrencies for the first time try to answer differently than
preceding digital cash schemes did in the past, for cryptocurrencies do not answer it by intro-
ducing a centrally trusted third party, i.e. a ‘mint’. There is no need for a ‘mint’ of this kind in
cryptocurrencies, because they introduce a specific concept to validate the chronological order
of transactions in a distributed fashion in a peer-to-peer network. We want to introduce this
concept to prevent double-spending that cryptocurrencies utilize in the following paragraphs.
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Time-stamping transactions Going back to our example, Carol can be sure that Bob did not
double-spend the ‘coin’, if there was a time-stamp included in the transaction in a way that it
can not be altered later on. If Carol can now see that there is no transaction by Bob concerning
this ‘coin’ that is older than the transaction to her, she knows Bob did not double-spend the
coin, or - if he tried to - Carol could prove that she was the legitimate owner of the ‘coin’ because
the transaction granting the ‘coin’ to her is the oldest.
Centrally authorized time-stamping Obviously the type of time-stamping just described and
its validation could be done via a central time-stamping server. However this - yet again -
would provide a target for attack and a central point of failure for the whole system. And
again cryptocurrencies of the Bitcoin kind provide a way to accomplish the time-stamping in
decentralized fashion.
A public ledger The solution to decentralized time-stamping is the publishing of a transaction,
including the time-stamp, within a ledger, we will call a blockchain. The public blockchain
is going to be accessible to every potentially interested party and by not only containing all
transactions but also the time-stamp of when they were created, this public ledger will contain
all the information necessary to determine who currently is the legitimate owner of the ‘coin’.
The question remains how this public ledger can be protected against attempts to maliciously
change it.
Proof of work To protect the public ledger against malicious change, it will be stored in
a distributed fashion with every participant - we will call them nodes from here on - and a
mechanism will be established that makes any change to this public ledger difficult.
1. There will only be one way to legitimately change the ledger (blockchain) and that is to
expand it, the blockchain can never be shrunk
2. Any legitimate change, in the sense that the ledger grows, can not be made for single
transactions but must be made in bundles of transactions, we will call blocks
3. The attachment of blocks to the blockchain can only be made after a ‘proof-of-work‘’ is
carried out for each block (see Nakamoto, 2008, pg. 3)
The ‘proof-of-work’ is going to involve a mathematical quest that will not be trivial to solve.
The quest will consist of the hashing of the block in a way that the hash created of the block
is smaller than a predefined number, we will call the target.34. This action is going to be done
by nodes that decide to participate in it. We will call these participating nodes from now on
miners and the action they participate in mining. If any node ex-post facto wants to change the
block in any way, has to redo the proof-of-word.
The successful mining of one block takes a specific amount of time by given computing power,
so if the majority of miners are honest, the blockchain that is honest should grow the fastest
and should be always the longest. Honest miners will always try to enlarge the currently longest
blockchain.
Separability of a ‘coin’ The ‘coin’ as defined by Nakamoto and used accordingly in this section
is what is always ‘spent’ in total as described in the example above and illustrated in figure 13.
The type of transaction used in our example here has exactly one input and one output. Either
the ‘coin’ is passed on entirely from Alice to Bob or it stays with Alice: one input (coin is entirely
owned by Alice), one output (coin is entirely owned by Bob). This principle would make a ‘coin’
the smallest denomination transferable.
34In Bitcoin not the entire block but the header of the block is hashed. See section 7.2.4.
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The bitcoin value Now there shall be a certain value included into the ‘coin’ that could be
distributed partially to Bob and the remainder to Alice. We will call this value the amount
of bitcoins. We want to establish a type of transaction that allows for a transfer of a certain
amount of bitcoins from Alice to Bob, without being limited to the nomination of one entire
‘coin’. This is what makes multi-input-multi-output transactions necessary.
Expanding on the fundamental principles We now want to expand on the fundamental prin-
ciples of cryptocurrencies that were so far just touched upon in this section and thereby start
our inquiry of the actual Bitcoin project.
7.2 Fundamentals
We are commencing the inquiry into Bitcoin as a specific cryptocurrency by explaining certain
fundamental terms, principles and concepts concerning the Bitcoin Network that the nodes
are building. These terms, principles and concepts were so far only briefly mentioned in the
preceding section, if at all. We start this inquiry form the view of a prospective user.
7.2.1 Clients, nodes and wallets
The very first step for any user of the peer-to-peer Bitcoin Network is to start participating in
it by becoming a part of it. This is done by installing a piece of software to a computer (or a
similar device) that is called a client.
Clients make computers into nodes The entry ticket to the Bitcoin Network for any user is
the open source client software that can be downloaded on bitcoin.org.35 It is by this software
that a computer can become a node within the peer-to-peer Bitcoin Network. According to
the peer-to-peer principle the nodes of the cryptocurrency Network are all equal in rights and
duties.36 This is a point that clearly differentiates cryptocurrencies from hierarchically designed
currencies. The client does provide for a user interface that allows users of the Network to
interact with it, for example initiate a bitcoin transaction from one node to another.
Wallet The client does create a file, which is called wallet that colloquially speaking ‘contains’
the bitcoins and holds them ready for the user to spend. However wallets do not literally contain
bitcoins, rather they contain private-/public-key-pairs we call transaction points that in turn
provide access to the bitcoins, as described in the following section 7.2.2.37
7.2.2 Transactions, addresses and transaction points
In the most general view a transaction in the cryptocurrency domain is a form of communication
between nodes and is first and foremost simply “a signed section of data that is broadcast to
the network”.38 Users of the Network can initiate transactions with their clients, typically to
transfer bitcoins.
35Various clients exist by various vendors and also for different platforms, including desktop wallets for computers,
mobile wallets for smartphones and other devices and also web wallets that can be accessed using any web
browser on any device. The standard client, which is the client that was published first and is since then
developed by the original development team of the Bitcoin project, can be accessed through https://bitcoin.
org/en/getting-started - accessed May 14th 2014.
36The nodes are all equal, provided they use the standard client or a client that implement every feature of the
standard client.
37Sometimes the whole client software is confusingly named ‘wallet’ even though the wallet is just a file that, most
importantly, contains the private-/public-key-pairs, we call transaction points - see https://en.bitcoin.it/
wiki/Wallet - accessed July 18th 2014.
38see https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Transactions - accessed July 17th 2014.
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The use of a transaction is to make bitcoins transferable from one transaction point to another.
To do this, every transaction has at least one input and one output. The input can be seen as
the source of bitcoins, it references the transaction point that already holds bitcoins, the output
can be seen as the target for the flow of funds and is a transaction point itself. The input of a
given transaction does always reference an output of a preceding transaction.
Addresses and transaction points On a keystroke of a user the client provides a public-
/private-key-pair that we call a transaction point in this work, incurring a term here that
was coined by Cap and used as a concept to explain the verification of transactions (see Cap,
2012, pg. 86). As an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)-key-pair, transaction
points are conforming to digital signature algorithms, as they were described in section 3.4. The
public-key is called address, the private-key of a transaction point does not have a specific name
in the cryptocurrency context.39 While being feasible, calling the public-key of the key-pair the
address is not entirely technically correct, as the actual address is not plainly the public-key,
but it is the hash of a multi-step hashing of the public key.40
In the most simple form imaginable a transaction point can be viewed as the combination of
a bank account number, resembling the public key, and an according pin, which stands for the
private key. The address, much like a newly created bank account, does initially not ‘contain’41
any bitcoins, the ‘account’ (address) is empty upon creation by a client. It can be ‘filled’ by
corresponding transactions.
The private key of the key-pair is used to digitally sign the transfer of bitcoins from a payer
to a payee by including the payee’s public key into the signature, which is created using the
private key of the payer. We will look at this process in greater detail, since it is an important
part of the verification of transactions within the Network, which itself is at the very heart of it.
Simple example Going back to the example of one ‘coin’ passing on from Alice to Bob and
from Bob to Carol, now just redone with a fixed amount of bitcoins, instead of one ‘coin’, and
depicted with the inclusion of the simplifying concept of transaction points. The communications
diagram in figure 14 is the illustration of the two transactions TA_1 and TA_2, transferring a
fixed amount of bitcoins first from Alice to Bob and then the same amount from Bob to Carol.
Both transactions having one input and one output each. The inputs and outputs are, what we
call transaction points.
In the beginning of this example Alice has already access to the transaction point TP_1,
which means she is equipped with the private key of TP_1, i.e. by having it stored in her
wallet. Alice now transfers all the bitcoins located at transaction point TP_1 to Bob, by
initiating transaction TA_1. She does so by including a hash of the previous transaction TA_0
(not shown in the illustration in figure 14) and the public key of TP_2, which Bob has control
over, into TA_1 and then digitally signing it using her private key that granted her access to
TP_1. Now Alice and Bob have to wait until TA_1 is verified by the Network (as described
below).
As soon as TA_1 is verified, Bob commands the bitcoins located at TP_2. He decides to
send them to Carol. To do so, Bob initiates a transaction TA_2. He includes into TA_2 a hash
of TA_1 that provided him access to the bitcoins that are currently at TP_2 and the public
key of transaction point TP_3 that only Carol has at her command. Carol must have sent the
information about her public key to Bob or made it otherwise available to him. Consequently
39see https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Address - accessed July 17th 2014.
40The hashing of the public key, thereby making it an address, is done for multiple reasons, including the reduction
of typing errors when inputting addresses. For more information about the technical background of addresses
see https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Technical_background_of_Bitcoin_addresses - accessed July 18th 2014.
41While ‘contain’ may match the metaphor of a bank account, the address itself is just the account number and
therefore does not ‘contain’ anything, except for the 27-34 alphanumeric characters it consists of.
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Legend:
TA := Transaction
TP := TransactionPoint
Bob gets access to TP_2, by having the
public key of TP_2 included in TA_1 by Alice
Bob has access to the TP_2 by being exclusively
equipped with the private key of TP_1,
typically TPs are stored in what is called
a wallet, a file created by the client software of 
the Network
Bob needs the private key to digitally sign TA_2
Input TP_2 is included in the current transaction TA_2 by referencing
- the previous transaction TA_1 that created TP_2 (called 'Previous tx' in standard client)
- the output index number of TP_2 (here: 0, because TA_1 has only one output, TP_2)
 
Bob then digitally signs the Transaction and is also putting a timestamp on it,
which is included in the hash that is signed
5: has access to 8: gets access to
Carol:Node
TP_3:TransactionPoint
7: creates output
6: digitally signs
6: input
TA_2:Transaction
4: gets access to
3: creates output
TP_2:TransactionPoint
Bob:Node
2: digitally signs
TA_1:Transaction
2: input
1: has access to
Alice:Node
TP_1:TransactionPoint
Figure 14: Communications diagram showing two single-input/single-output transactions TA_1
and TA_2 passing on a fixed amount of bitcoins first from Alice to Bob (steps 1. -
4.) and subsequently from Bob to Carol (steps 5. - 8.).
Bob signs TA_2 with the private key of TP_2 that only he has in his wallet, thereby making
him the only node with the capability to create a valid transaction TA_2 that attempts to send
the bitcoins at TP_2. Now Bob broadcasts TA_2 to the whole Network and Carol has to wait
for the verification of TA_2, for her to have the bitcoins now at her disposal at transaction point
TP_3.
Verification of transactions The verification of transactions is a key ingredient of the Bitcoin
Network, especially if it is used as a payment system. Transactions can be employed to perform
payments within the Network.
Transactions are verified in multiple steps:
1. The transaction is broadcast to the Network by the node that created it
2. Following the publication the transaction is added to the current block by all miners
3. By successfully hashing the current block that contains the transaction, it is added to the
blockchain within the most recent block and thereby verified for the first time
4. Further confirmation happens with every additional block that is added to the blockchain
after the block containing the transaction in question. This process is described in more
detail in paragraph ‘Forking on purpose’ on page 44.
The following section 7.2.3 explains the central data type for storing information in the Net-
work, called ‘blocks’ and the public data structure that stores generated blocks in a sequence,
called the ‘blockchain’. It is followed by section 7.2.4 that goes into details on bitcoin mining.
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7.2.3 Blocks and the blockchain
1 1..* TransactionBlockBlockChain 1..*1
Figure 15: Conceptual class diagram that shows composition relationships between transactions
and a block and between blocks and the blockchain.
We have so far used the concepts of blocks and the blockchain in our explanation, without
providing any significant details about them. This shall be done as follows.
Blocks Blocks are data types that are employed to permanently store data within the Bitcoin
Network.42 The main reason to want to permanently store data with the Network is found in the
way that transactions are verified by the Network, by permanently keeping all the information
about them publicly accessible.
As is shown in figure 15 a block consists of multiple transactions, which must not be contained
within any other block. Every single block does always reference exactly one preceding block
by containing a hash of the referenced block. This feature is what creates the blockchain that
therefore consists of multiple blocks.
The most recent block does contain some or (ideally) all transactions that have been broadcast
to the Network but are so far not stored in any preceding blocks which are already part of the
blockchain. To become part of the blockchain a block needs to be generated by a mining node.
This process of mining is explained in section 7.2.4.
6:Block
5:Block 5':Block
4':Block4:Block
3:Block
2':Block 2:Block
1:Block
0:Block
Figure 16: Blockchain, starting with the gen-
esis block 0 going to the most re-
cently generated block 6 on top.
Orphans 2’, 4’ and 5’ are red.
Blockchain A blockchain is a specific path within
a tree data structure that consists of generated
blocks, each referencing exactly one previously gen-
erated block as is shown in figure 16.
Successful mining adds the current block as the
most recent to the blockchain making it a gener-
ated block, thereby rewarding the successful miner.
The dominating blockchain is the longest one (de-
termined by difficulty, not by mere number of
blocks) that is relevant for the current distribution
of all bitcoins. As mentioned in 7.2.2 all trans-
actions that are stored within the blocks in the
longest blockchain are considered verified. Transac-
tion points are the outputs of transactions. There-
fore the longest blockchain determines how many
bitcoins currently are accessible at which specific
transaction point. This is the motivation for nodes
to add the block they are currently working on
to the longest blockchain. Honest miners will al-
ways try to add the block that they are currently
working on to the longest blockchain, making this
blockchain the dominant one (see section 7.2.4 on
mining for more details).
42see https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Block - accessed July 19th 2014.
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Since the genesis block is the very first block that was ever generated it is the only block that
contains no reference to a previous block. It is contained in every blockchain and therefore is
always part of the longest blockchain, too. The genesis block is special in the way that it consists
of only one coinbase transaction that has one input of 50 brand new bitcoins and one output
(see 7.2.4 for more details).43 The blockchain is being shared amongst all nodes participating
in the Network, therefore all nodes do always know how many bitcoins are accessible from
which transaction point or to translate this into terms that are well known from banking: every
single node knows exactly how many bitcoins are on what ‘bank account’ by consultation of the
completely public ledger that contains every relevant transaction. This public ledger is known
as the blockchain.
Forking the blockchain It is worthwhile to mention that under certain circumstances it is
possible for the blockchain to (temporarily) fork. One such possibility is the simultaneous
or almost simultaneous successful hashing of the current block by two different miners, both
referencing the same previous block. This is shown in figure 16, where blocks 2 and 2’ are both
referencing the same block 1. This can occur theoretically completely unintentionally for latency
issues within the peer-to-peer Network. The very next generated block 3 however has to reference
again exactly one previous block, 3 does reference 2 here, making the one specific blockchain
containing the most recent block longer again (except the same circumstances happen again and
the successful mining happens again virtually simultaneously), thereby orphaning block 2’. The
transactions that are contained in 2’ but are not contained within 2 have to be rebroadcast to
the Network and included again in the then current block for verification.
Forking on purpose Forking of the blockchain can be done on purpose by an attacking node,
with the aim to maliciously revise the transaction history. The goal of intentional forking is to
try to double-spend bitcoins by creating an alternate blockchain that eventually becomes the
dominant one. We will illustrate this potential attack here using figure 16 on page 43.
Let’s assume Mallory and Alice are in a business transaction, where Mallory wants an asset,
good or service from Alice.
1. Mallory offers to pay Alice using the Bitcoin Network as a CPS.44
2. Mallory first broadcasts an honest transaction TAh to the Network that is sending bitcoins
from a transaction point TPM , controlled by Mallory, to a transaction point TPA that is
controlled by Alice.
3. As TAh gets verified the first time by being included in block 4 that is added to the
blockchain, Alice may already feel paid and therefore perform what was requested by
Mallory. For example, Alice could send some physical good to Mallory as soon as she sees
that transaction TAh was verified the very first time.
4. Now Mallory, being the attacker, tries to successfully mine block 4’ that contains virtually
all the same transactions that block 4 contains, except for transaction TAh, which is
replaced by TAm that sends bitcoins not from TPM to TPA but to another TP ′M that also
Mallory controls.
5. At this point Mallory tries to add another block 5’ to the blockchain before block 5 is
added. If she is successful, she has effectively created the longest blockchain that now
contains ‘her’ malicious TAm.
43The actual genesis block of Bitcoin can be accessed as block 0 of the Bitcoin blockchain at http://
blockexplorer.com/block/000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f - ac-
cessed July 20th 2014.
44We will go into the details of using the Bitcoin Network as a payment system in section 7.3 on page 50.
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This just briefly described attack to maliciously fork the blockchain on purpose is not very
likely accomplished successfully. Other honest miners are trying to add block 5 already, while
Mallory is still working on block 4’ to be successfully hashed and added to the blockchain. So
if Mallory is not lucky right at the beginning her chances of succeeding with this kind of attack
are small. Mallory needs to convince a the receiving node (Alice) that she has sent bitcoins to
her, by allowing at the very least one block containing the first transaction to be added to the
still honest blockchain.
This fact of an attacker having to catch up with the honest blockchain makes this kind of attack
very unlikely as is shown by Nakamoto (see Nakamoto, 2008, pg. 6f.). Still a potential attacker
could get lucky and it is therefore recommended to wait more than just one confirmation, to
make the number of additional honest blocks a potential attacker has to jump almost impossible.
The probability P for an attacker to be successful in the way described decreases exponentially
with the number of honest blocks z he has to overcome. For example waiting not only for the
first confirmation but for six additional generated blocks, making the total waiting time roughly
70 minutes, the probability for the attacker to be successful drops to P = 0.0000647 with z = 7
(see Nakamoto, 2008, pg. 8).
The blockchain as it is described here and the corresponding algorithm creating it and making
it work is considered the main innovation of Bitcoin.45
7.2.4 Mining
So far we have just stated that successful mining creates a generated block and that it is then
added to the blockchain. We have not yet explained what mining is, why miners are keen to do
it and how it can be done successfully. This explanation is going follow here.
Block hashing algorithm If a node decides to start mining bitcoins it executes the following
algorithm:46
1. Harvest from the Network as many transactions as possible that are so far not part of a
generated block in the longest blockchain and are therefore not verified yet.
2. Validate newly harvested transactions. Check for inconsistencies in signatures, script and
hashes and for double-spending of bitcoins, especially by comparing the timestamps of the
inputs of the broadcast transaction with those in the locally stored blockchain
3. Put new validated transactions into the current block (and forward them to the peer-to-
peer Network) and discard invalid transactions
4. Create new hash of all validated transactions47
5. Put the hash of the previous block (hashPrevBlock), the hash of all current transactions
(hashMerkleRoot)48, a timestamp, the current target and a random number called nonce
into what is called the block’s header
6. Hash the current block’s header
7. Compare the just created hash to the target
45see https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Blockchain - accessed July 19th 2014.
46see https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Block_hashing_algorithm - accessed July 20th 2014.
47this hash is called hashMerkleRoot, because it is the root of a Merkle hash tree. Merkle trees were mentioned
as an application of cryptographic hashing in 3.3 and are briefly depicted by Nakamoto (see Nakamoto, 2008,
pg. 4).
48By putting just a hash into the block’s header and not all transactions, the time needed for hashing the header
is constant, whether the block contains 1 or 1000 transactions.
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a) If the hash is greater than the target, then start again at step 1., making sure that
at least the nonce is incremented and thereby changed to receive a totally different
hash for the current block’s header.
b) If the hash is equal to or smaller than the target, proceed to step 8.
8. The miner was successful.
9. The successful miner broadcasts the complete block to the Network including the successful
nonce.
10. Other miners in the Network check the broadcast block by rehashing it with the given
values. The approval of a once successfully generated block is simple compared to the
mining.
a) If all transactions are valid and do not double-spend and the hashing with the pro-
posed nonce yields a hash that is smaller than the target proceed to step 11.
b) If there is any problem with the proposed block, disregard it and continue with step
1.
11. Other miners express their acceptance of the newly generated block that was just broadcast
to the Network by adding it as the most recent block in their blockchain, too. They are
referencing now this newly generated block in the hashPrevBlock field of their current
block and start again from step 1 completely updating their current block.
12. The successful miner receives newly created bitcoins in a coinbase transaction that now is
part of the blockchain of all approving miners.
The block hashing algorithm depicted here is based on Nakamoto’s proposition (see Nakamoto,
2008, pg. 4) and on analysis from Hobson (see Hobson, 2013, pg. 42) and Nielsen (2013). To
further the understanding of entities involved in mining we created a simple object model that
is show in figure 17.
11..*
1
1..*
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contains all
generated Blocks
Miners are
Nodes that
decided to hash
the current Block
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from the Network and
add new Transactions to 
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(Block's header is actually
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Figure 17: Object model showing the relevant objects and their relations involved in the hashing
of a block (bitcoin mining).
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Creating bitcoins New bitcoins are created as a so called coinbase transaction in every gen-
erated block. Within this transaction the node that generated the block first receives newly
created bitcoins. In Bitcoin terminology these additional bitcoins are ‘mined’. The initial re-
ward was 50 XBT. Currently (July 2014) it has dropped to 25 XBT per coinbase transaction
as can be seen in figure 18 that contains a screen shot of the coinbase of an actual block, block
#312286.
Figure 18: Screenshot of a coinbase transaction, created with a block explorer.49
The coinbase transaction, rewarding brand new bitcoins to the miner is the incentive to provide
computational power, which is obviously required to engage in mining. It is this incentive that
should keep malicious miners or attackers from defrauding honest nodes, because instead of
cheating they might as well choose to gain from being honest, thereby strengthening the overall
health of the blockchain and thereby the Network as a total.
Nakamoto puts it this way:
“If a greedy attacker is able to assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes,
he would have to choose between using it to defraud people by stealing back his
payments, or using it to generate new coins. He ought to find it more profitable to
play by the rules, such rules that favour him with more new coins than everyone else
combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth.” (see
Nakamoto, 2008, pg. 4)
So, to offer an incentive to miners by awarding them new bitcoins is an important feature of
Bitcoin. We might assume that a drop in incentive might result in a drop in the soundness of
the Network.
Constant rate of generated blocks We have already mentioned the target as a property of
a block. A successful miner needs to create a hash of the current block that is equal to or
lower than the target. This target (and thereby also the difficulty) is adjusted by a so called
retarget every 201650 generated blocks in such a way that the generation of a block happens at
a constant rate of roughly one block every 10 minutes. This is also the average time it takes for
a transaction to be verified once.
Total bitcoin supply The total amount of bitcoins that will ever be mined was determined
by Nakamoto and subsequently by the software development team that currently maintains the
standard client to 21 Million bitcoins. This effectively means that at some point no new coins are
going to be rewarded to successful miners any more, thereby obviously changing the incentive
for miners at the latest at that point in time.
The date of this happening is more than a hundred years away, since the coinbase rewards
are halved every 210.000 generated blocks, which at the current rate of one generated block
every ten minutes corresponds to roughly 4 years for each bisection of rewards. This leads to
an asymptotic approach of the targeted 21 Million bitcoins that will be never reached. Ceteris
paribus mining will stop to create new bitcoins right around 2140, for the very last bisection
50see https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Difficulty - accessed July 22nd 2014.
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from 0.00000001 XBT, or 1 satoshi will drop to 0 satoshi with the completion of generated block
#6, 929, 999.51
Transaction fees What is also visible in figure 18 is that additionally to the reward that
created 25 brand new bitcoins in the coinbase transaction the miner is rewarded - in this case -
additional 0.0194147 bitcoin in transaction fees. This is equalling roughly $ 12 at a price of $
625 per bitcoin, which was the price of the latest trade on https://www.bitstamp.net/ on July
20th 2014. The fees are paid by the creators of the 132 other transactions that are contained in
this very block.52
Incentive for mining after coinbase transactions stop As explained above in the paragraph
on creating bitcoins, mining is critical to confirming transactions and therefore to the overall
health of the blockchain and the Network, it cannot just stop or even fall dramatically however
far away this point in time is, if the Network is not supposed to stop at that time, too.
The answer to this pending question are transaction fees that will have to be high enough
to keep mining profitable, but low enough to not take away the feature of Bitcoin of being
able to offer transactions at competitive transaction costs for its users. Therefore the sufficient
motivation of miners especially after coinbase transactions stop, is a non trivial issue that, if
not successfully provided, also might make Bitcoin potentially vulnerable to a revision of the
entire blockchain, called a history revision attack (see Barber et al. , 2012, pg. 405). This type
of attack on the soundness of the blockchain was in principle already described in this work as
the intentional forking of the blockchain. If the incentive for miners however becomes so low to
allow a successful ‘doomsday’ history revision attack, then the intentional forking does not only
allow for the double-spending of a limited number of bitcoin, but the manipulation of big parts
of the entire blockchain is meant. A successful history revision attack of this kind might not
only harm single users but could potentially endanger the whole Bitcoin project .
Ideas on how to potentially prevent this type of attack even though mining will at some point
stop to create new bitcoins as incentive are given by Barber et al. (see Barber et al. , 2012, pg.
406f.).
7.2.5 What a bitcoin is eventually
All of the above put together means that our current understanding of a bitcoin is that it is
not a token or coin and certainly not a physical thing. A bitcoin is, above all, a real number
with eight decimal places located at a specific transaction point.53 The tamper-proof public
ledger called blockchain that contains these numbers in blocks determines how many bitcoins
are accessible at each transaction point.54
Superficially treated this seems to very much resemble the type of money that is created and
managed by commercial banks. They create bankmoney in their ledgers, by an exchange of
IOUs with their debtors. This type of money, also seems to be ‘just’ a number that can not
be tampered with easily, albeit not prevented by the public blockchain and the corresponding
cryptographic protocol, but by a central authority called a bank.
51see https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/FAQ#How_long_will_it_take_to_generate_all_the_coins.3F - accessed
July 22nd 2014.
52see information on this block at http://blockexplorer.com/block/... - accessed July 20th 2014.
53In fact, the bitcoins at transaction points are not stored as a real, but as an 8 Byte non-negative integer, since
they are stored as satoshis - see ‘value’ field in Txout here: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Transactions#
general_format_.28inside_a_block.29_of_each_output_of_a_transaction_-_Txout - accessed July 20th
2014.
54Transaction point are used here as simplifying abstract entities to explain the transfer of a value of bitcoins.
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Obviously this naive view does neither hold for banks nor for Bitcoin, which is why we want
to look at the actual use of both, the CPS and the BPS. The CPS is analysed extensively in
section 7.3 and the BPS in section 8.3.
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7.3 Cryptocurrency Payment System
We now want to look at Bitcoin as a payment system specifically, basing our analysis on the
findings in section 6, where we did a requirements analysis for a hypothetical payment system,
thereby building a terminology concerning money we want to employ here on Bitcoin as a CPS.
Motivation for this section Since Bitcoin was specifically planned and designed by one entity,
it seems plausible to assume that this entity had either explicit or implicit assumptions about
the requirements that Bitcoin as a payment system would have to fulfil for it to be used as such.
We want to find out what these assumed requirements were and if they match with those we
found to be essential for a payment system in section 6. What requirements did the designers
of the Bitcoin payment system - probably - have in mind? What requirements that are a result
of our analysis does the Bitcoin Network fulfil?
How the Network may serve as a CPS It is not trivial to understand how the Network may
serve as a payment system at all. The name of the project is Bitcoin and its proposed money is
called bitcoin. Contrary to the intuition that the name provides however, there are no bitcoins
actually passed on from hand to hand. So far, our understanding in this work of bitcoins is
emphasizing that bitcoins are first and foremost (near) tamper-proof real numbers with eight
decimal places, as we have just seen in section 7.2.5. But how exactly does a tamper-proof
number serve as money that can be used for payments?
Approach - looking at the CPS from the view of a user We are discussing the functional
principles of cryptocurrencies in detail in this section by going through fully-dressed use cases
based on suggestions by Cockburn (2004). We find the view of an actual user as a starting point
for the analysis of the CPS most valuable. The aim is to explore the capabilities of Bitcoin as
a CPS and then compare these findings to the necessary functions of a (hypothetical) payment
system we found in section 6.
7.3.1 Use case diagrams
We want to first generate an overview on the use of Bitcoin as a CPS. We hope to achieve this
by depicting use case diagrams that show our progression of understanding payment systems in
general, as it is shown as a synopsis in section 6.7, transferred to Bitcoin that shall be evaluated
as a CPS. Furthermore we want to include additional detail that is required to understand the
Bitcoin Network from a user perspective, thereby integrating what is called mining into our
understanding.
CPSUser Holding on
to bitcoin
Pricing
in bitcoin
Paying
with bitcoin
CPS
Figure 19: Initial use case diagram on Bitcoin used as a CPS.
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Figure 19 shows three use cases for a CPS that are already well known in principle from the
use cases that were identified for a hypothetical payment system in sections 6 and specifically
6.1. The difference is that the payment system is a CPS and that therefore the notion of money
in general is replaced by the money of the CPS called bitcoin. The three use cases yielded are
as follows:
• Paying with bitcoin - bitcoin is used by the Payer and accepted by the Payee as the
money proper to fulfil debts nominated in bitcoin as the money of account. This is ex-
panded on in section 7.3.3
• Pricing in bitcoin - bitcoin is used as the money of account for the pricing of assets,
goods and services and for the nomination of other types of contracts. This is expanded
on in section 7.3.4
• Holding on to bitcoin - bitcoin is used by a Hoarder, whose aim is to hold on to bitcoins.
This is expanded on in section 7.3.5
If we include the findings on payment systems and money in general into a use case diagram
for the CPS, we receive the diagram shown in figure 20.
«include»
«include»
CPSUser Holding on
to bitcoin
Pricing
in bitcoin
Paying
with bitcoin
CPS
Figure 20: Use case diagram on Bitcoin used as a payment system that takes the hierarchy of
functional requirements on money into account.
Again, making visible that there is a hierarchy on the functional requirements of a payment
system that holds true for the CPS as well.
‘Holding on to bitcoin’ includes ‘Paying with bitcoin’ If a hoarder is holding on to bitcoins,
we must assume he does so, because he expects to be able to make payments with the hoarded
bitcoins at a later stage. The argument is the same as it is for a hypothetical payment system.
It just does not make sense to hold on to any bitcoin if it is not possible to make payments with
the hoarded bitcoins at a later stage. Even if payments right now were considered impossible,
we must consider it at least an unconscious assumption by the bitcoin hoarder to expect to be
able to make payments in the future. If the assumption of the hoarder was to never be able
to make any payments with hoarded bitcoins, then a holding on to them still could hardly be
explained by rational motives.
‘Paying with bitcoin’ includes ‘Pricing in bitcoin’ The pricing in bitcoin means the offering of
assets, goods and services at a price nominated in bitcoin. Paying with bitcoin is the fulfilment of
dues payable in bitcoin. Consequently, if there are no price tags to be found that are nominated
in bitcoin, then there will be no payments in bitcoin. To clarify the meaning of this point:
imagine if the CPS was designed to perfectly process payments in a way that they were fast,
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secure and reliable but it was not designed to motivate users to use the money of the CPS as
money of account, then what good is the perfect processing of (potential) payments, if there are
none?
However we want to state that the relationship is similarly close if viewed vice versa. It hardly
makes any sense to price assets, goods and services in bitcoin and specify contracts using it as
money of account if there isn’t a means of final settlement of debt, i.e. a money proper, available.
What a precarious situation would any debtor be in, if he was in debt in money of account that
does not have a corresponding money proper? In Bitcoin terms, this would mean actors could
get into debt, owing a certain amount of bitcoins, but there was no means of payment, no money
proper available. Obviously debtors would have to avoid making any purchases that create a
debt they can never pay down for lack of a money proper. This is why we consider both, the
money proper and the money of account as emergent properties of a payment system, as we
have already termed them in section 6.5 and shown in figure 7 on page 30.
We have renounced to show the reciprocity of relationships ‘Paying with bitcoin’ and ‘Pricing
in bitcoin’ in the use case diagram, for we deem the implicit assumption to have to have a
money proper available (= the ability to successfully make payments) if a corresponding money
of account is used as rather common, than the relationship vice versa. That is why we want
to emphasize the «include»-relationship from ‘Paying with bitcoin’ to ‘Pricing in bitcoin’ by
including it explicitly in the use case diagram.
Including the Network We want to abstract for a minute from the hierarchy of the functional
requirements for money and quickly go back to figure 19 (page 50) and expand our understanding
form there.
Miner
Mining
«include»
CPSUser Holding on
to bitcoin
Pricing
in bitcoin
Paying
with bitcoin
CPS
Network
Figure 21: Nested systems diagram on Bitcoin used as a payment system that is enclosed by the
Network, which provides an additional use case called ‘Mining’.
Figure 21 is the attempt to broaden the view portrayed in figure 19 to now include the Bitcoin
Network, which does serve as a CPS here and therefore contains all the use cases of the CPS
itself. We are showing the CPS with all its use cases as being contained as a whole within the
Network, in what we want to call a nested systems diagram, for lack of a better term.55 The
purpose is to show that the additional use case called Mining is specifically part of the Network.
It is not at the user goal level of the CPS as it is nothing that the actual CPSUsers are interested
in. It is a sort of back-office use case that is included by other use cases, as is shown in figure
21, but this inclusion does not mean Miners are CPSUsers. Miners are not primarily interested
in the payment functions of the CPS, they are interested in the incentives that are related to
55Without going into the details here, a meta-model for the ‘nested systems diagram’ we use here would essentially
match the meta-model for use case diagrams in the Unified Modeling Language (UML) today, except for the
permission of a ‘nesting’ of system boundaries
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mining.56 However, it must be noted here that the incentive for mining is certainly closely
connected to the performance of Bitcoin as a payment system, for if it was entirely useless, what
good would it be to mine additional bitcoins? We will see in section 7.4 that successful miners
can sell their bitcoins to other traders by means of what we call the EcoSystem.
Including the MMI During the analysis of a hypothetical payment system in section 6 the role
that the MMI plays was discovered, thereby creating the term in the process. The MMI was
explained further in section 6.6. The analysis in section 6 was done having the BPS in mind
(as the status quo) that is embedded in a MMI that consists of various governmental agencies,
institutions as well as certain civil and legal norms.
MMI
MinerMining
«include»
CPSUser Holding on
to bitcoin
Pricing
in bitcoin
Paying
with bitcoin
CPS
Network
Figure 22: Including the MMI into the diagram that shows the CPS, the Network and the Miner.
The MMI that the CPS could potentially be embedded in seems to be rather difficult to
determine right away. We can assume however that potential users of the CPS will call for the
possibility of legal remedies the same way users of the BPS do. Not regularly, but as soon as
contractual nuisances or other problems occur. We include the MMI for the CPS as a supporting
actor in the use case diagram as shown in 22.
Assembling hierarchy, Network and MMI If we put the findings on the hierarchy of functional
requirements, the Network and the MMI into one use case diagram we receive the one shown in
figure 23.
7.3.2 Users
The users of Bitcoin as a CPS are naturally synonymous to the users identified for a hypothetical
payment system in section 6.1.1 on page 20. We list them here again in brief, modified however
for the use of Bitcoin as a specific CPS:
• Payer
A payer is an actor that has to perform payments using bitcoin, the money proper of the
Bitcoin project.
• Payee
A payee is an actor that receives payments in bitcoin.
• Adopter
An Adopter is pricing assets, goods or services in bitcoin, using it as a money of account.
56The incentives for miners and the important role these incentives play in the overall health of the Network are
described in section 7.2.4.
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MMI
Pricing
in bitcoin
«include»
«include»
Paying
with bitcoin Miner
Mining
«include»
CPSUser Holding on
to bitcoin
CPS
Network
Figure 23: Nested systems diagram showing the enclosing Network, the supporting agent MMI
and does include the hierarchy of payment system requirements as «include»-relations.
• Hoarder
Hoarders intend to stash away bitcoins for later use. Potentially exploiting the proposed
lack of governmental influence in Bitcoin.
These 4 types of users have been aggregated as CPSUsers. If we expand our view to include
the Network, as is shown in figure 21 on page 52, additional users that are identifiable are
Miners.
• Miner
A Miner is a primary and arguably a secondary user, too. On the one hand the miner is
engaged in mining for the incentives it provides by itself. On the other hand without the
miners a successful verification of payment transactions by including them in the public
blockchain is impossible. In this sense Miners are supporting actors for the CPS to be able
to successfully process payments
7.3.3 Use Case: Paying with bitcoin
For use cases be rather incomplete without being written out, we want to include at this point
a written out form of the use case ‘Paying with bitcoin’ that is oriented on the fully-dressed use
case format proposed by Cockburn (2004).
Scope Cryptocurrency Payment System (Bitcoin)
Level User Goal
Primary Actor Payer and Payee
Stakeholders and Interests
1. Payer
a) has transaction points (addresses (public key) with bitcoins stored that he has access
to by means of the private key) in his wallet to transfer bitcoins from
b) wants to make payment to Payee
c) wants to be able to pay in various amounts
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d) wants to receive change from transactions
2. Payee
a) has an address
b) wants to be paid on time
c) does not want to have his bitcoin payment compromised by double-spending
Preconditions
1. Payer and Payee use the client software to participate in the Network
2. Payer is in debt to Payee that is to be settled in money proper of the CPS (i.e. bitcoin)
3. Payer controls transaction points that grant access to enough bitcoin to meet the amount
that is due
Postconditions
1. Payee is paid successfully, by now holding transaction points in his wallet that grant access
to bitcoins in the amount due
Main Success Scenario
1. Payer logs in to his Node
2. Payee provides Payer with his receiving Address (col. „account number“)
3. Payer provides Node with Address of Payee and the Amount (= value) to be sent
4. Node of Payer initiates transaction TA and broadcasts TA to Network
5. Network verifies TA
6. Payee logs in to his Node that becomes part of Network
7. Payee recognizes funds as received
Creating an object model If we identify the relevant nouns in the written out use case above,
we find:
• Payer
• Node
• Payee
• Address
• Amount (value)
• Transaction
• Network.
Putting these nouns in a domain model for a payment transaction is the next step in our analysis
of using the CPS for the purpose of performing payment. The domain model is shown in figure
24.
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Figure 24: Object model showing the relevant objects and their relations involved in the com-
pletion of a payment transaction in a CPS.
Bitcoin as a money proper Being able to receive change in a Bitcoin transaction is a re-
quirement deducted from the written out use case ‘Paying with bitcoin’. Providing the ability
to receive change in a CPS payment transaction involves the creation of a single-input/multi-
output transaction. We want to cover this type of transaction by going through an example
at this point that involves a multi-input/multi-output transaction, thereby including single-
input/multi-output transactions.
A multi-input/multi-output example We assume Alice wants to make a payment to Bob in
the amount of 10 bitcoin. If Alice was equipped with a transaction point that holds precisely
10 bitcoin the example would be done at this point, since we could simply refer to the example
involving single-input/single-output transactions in the simple example on page 41. While in
this example here Alice does have the funds to pay 10 bitcoin to Bob, her funds are not located
at one transaction point, but distributed at three different transaction points TP_1, TP_2 and
TP_3.57
• TP_1 holds 5 bitcoin
• TP_2 holds 4 bitcoin
• TP_3 holds 3 bitcoin
All of these transaction points are controlled by Alice. To make the payment of 10 bitcoin to
Bob, she creates transaction TA that will include:
• the message digesthash of all three previous transactions that created TP_1, TP_2 and
TP_3
• the public key of TP_4 that will grant Bob access to his 10 bitcoins
57This is based on an example given by Cap (Cap, 2012, pg. 86).
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Alice is the Payer Bob is the Payee
Alice:Node
2: input
2: input
2: input
All bitcoins at these input TransactionPoints (TP)
will be spent into the output TPs.
Change is handled by creating a new output (TP_5)
for Alice that grants her access to the change
Alice can access her 
change of 2 bitcoins
at TP_5
Bob can now access
his 10 bitcoins at TP_4
4: gets access to 4: gets access to Bob:Node
2: digitally signs
1: has access to
3: output
3: output
TP_5
value=2
TP_4
value=10
TP_3
value=3
TP_2
value=4
TP_1
value=5
TA
totalIn = 12
totalOut = 12
Figure 25: Communications diagram showing an example of a multi-input/multi-output trans-
action.
• the public key of TP_5 that will grant her access to the 2 remaining bitcoins in change
Alice will subsequently digitally sign the transaction, by including all private keys of TP_1,
TP_2 and TP_3. They will be verified by a scripting system that is involved in the verification
of all transactions, we have just so far seen no need in mentioning it. This scripting system
allows for the creation of a valid multi-input transaction of this kind only if all input transaction
points are authorized by providing each and every private key, otherwise the funds at the inputs
cannot be transferred. The script compares every one of private keys individually for verification
purposes.58.
TA is then broadcast by Alice to the Network and Bob just needs to wait for verification, by
seeing TA included in a block that is part of the longest blockchain. Ideally Bob will wait until
a few blocks are attached after the block containing TA. Figure 25 is illustrating the effect of a
verified multi-input/multi-output transaction.
7.3.4 Use Case: Pricing in bitcoin
Scope Cryptocurrency Payment System
Level User Goal
Primary Actor Adopter
Stakeholders and Interests
1. Adopter
Preconditions
1. Cryptocurrency Payment System provides a unit
Postconditions
58see https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Transactions#Verification - accessed July 26th 2014.
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Main Success Scenario
1. Adopter uses bitcoin as money of account
2. Adopter is pricing assets, goods or services, as well as nomination of contracts in bitcoin
3. All contracts are successfully fulfilled
Extensions
3. a) Contractual nuisances happen, e.g. payment does not happen afterwards
b) Adopter needs to seek remedy
Bitcoin as a money of account The Bitcoin community itself claims that
“Bitcoins have value because they are useful and because they are scarce. As they
are accepted by more merchants, their value will stabilize.”59
However the notion of scarcity as the source of ‘value’ is justifiably discarded in the same
paragraph:
“If confidence in Bitcoins (sic) is lost then it will not matter that the supply can no
longer be increased, the demand will fall off with all holders trying to get rid of their
coins.”60
While we do agree to the content of this quotation in principle, we want to emphasize that the
notion of ‘confidence’ in a money is first and foremost expressed by the use of it as the money
of account. For tagging an asset with a price nominated in this money of account is an offer
to sell it. The act to choose the tagging is the expression of confidence in a money. While it
is clear that no one today is forced to tag their assets with prices nominated in bitcoin, this is
also not true for conventional currencies in nation states with legal tender laws as described in
section 6.3.1. The pricing of assets, goods and services always happens voluntarily, but once a
debt is created (e.g. by initiation of a purchase) the acceptance of the tendering of currency as
payment is not voluntary. So, for Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies there probably lies much
potential in convincing merchants and other users to price their assets, goods and services in
bitcoin. How to design a cryptocurrency precisely in a way that is attractive for users to use
the cryptocurrency as their money of account is beyond the scope of this work, but we hope
to at least lay it open and approach this issue with the work at hand. Simply assuming that
cryptocurrencies already are designed in this way might be considered bold, but certainly will
not help in the advancement of cryptocurrencies if it was ever not the case.
7.3.5 Use Case: Holding on to bitcoin
Scope Cryptocurrency Payment System
Level User Goal
Primary Actor Hoarder
59see https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/FAQ#Where_does_the_value_of_Bitcoin_stem_from.3F_What_backs_up_
Bitcoin.3F - accessed Jul 23rd 2014.
60ibid.
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Stakeholders and Interests
1. Hoarder
a) wants to hold on to bitcoin
b) does not want his bitcoin to lose value significantly
c) wants to spend his bitcoins at a later point in time
d) wants to stash bitcoins away for deliberations on security, especially considering macro
risk on governments cracking down on hoarders of their money
Main Success Scenario
1. Hoarder holds on to bitcoin for as long as he wants
2. Hoarder spends bitcoin at a later point in time
Extensions
1. a) Stashed away bitcoins are not used as money of account and therefore hardly as
money proper
b) The price in currency of stored bitcoins falls significantly
c) Purpose of hoarding failed
Bitcoin as a store of value Holding on to bitcoins means that transaction points are stored
in the wallet that allow access to bitcoin. This almost sounds like there was some thing to
hold on to. Rather, a transaction point equipped with enough access to bitcoins allows for the
creation of a valid transaction that will be accepted by miners and therefore eventually put
into the blockchain. Thereby putting a time-stamp on it, which allows for the checking against
double-spending.
If we insist on thinking of a bitcoin as a thing, we might want to remember the explanation
given in the original white paper on Bitcoin (see Nakamoto, 2008, pg. 2). A ‘coin’ - as defined
by Nakamoto and laid out extensively in section 7.1 - is a chain of digitally signed sections of
data.61 One section of data does not have a lot of effect on anything, so the ‘coin’ is a whole
chain of digitally signed sections of data, the ‘coin’ ‘changing hands’, so to speak, by the intent
of the current owner, which is expressed by his digital signature on the data, thereby including
the subsequent owners address. Now, only the subsequent owner can again produce a valid
signature on the ‘coin’ to spend it. All this is not new to us at this point.
Holding on to a coin in this sense then means not to sign the ‘coin’ again, thereby not passing
it on. Alternatively an owner can hold on to his wealth stored in the ‘coin’ by signing the ‘coin’,
but to an address only he himself has access to.
7.4 Bitcoin EcoSystem
At this point we want to broaden our view on Bitcoin even further and include the EcoSystem
that has sprung up around the Bitcoin Network. This section will try to give answers to the
question what the EcoSystem is and what it does provide from a users perspective.
7.4.1 Including the EcoSystem
With the Bitcoin EcoSystem we extend our assessment to all supporting The nested systems
diagram in figure 26 shows the EcoSystem enclosing the entire Network.
61Again: The way digital signatures work is briefly described in section 3.4, which contains a description of the
principle digital signature algorithms work on.
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Figure 26: Nested systems diagram that includes the Network and the EcoSystem.
Getting a hold of bitcoins There are essentially two ways to get a hold of bitcoins:
• Creating new bitcoins, by successfully mining a block
• By ‘trading in currencies’ as is shown in figure 26, here is specifically just one side of the
trade meant, namely the buying of bitcoins with currency (or bankmoney) to get a hold
of them
Bitcoins can naturally be bought peer-to-peer by meeting people physically and handing over
currency in cash. However we want to allude to specific marketplaces, called ‘exchanges’, which
allow trading in bitcoins.62
7.4.2 Use case: ‘Trading in currencies’
When there are buyers of something anywhere, then there must be sellers there of the same
thing accordingly. The same is naturally true for bitcoins, too. Every time an amount of bitcoin
is bought by a buyer on an exchange (or wherever else)the same amount was sold by a seller on
the same exchange (or the same place).63
By ‘trading in currencies’ we mean the trading that is done by buyers and sellers of bitcoin
into and out of currencies. This can be seen very much like the trading on foreign exchange
markets.64 In an attempt to be precise in our language, throughout this work we specifically
never speak of ‘buying’ when a purchase is made of an asset, a good or a service that had a price
tag nominated in bitcoin. The just described action is the payment with bitcoin of a purchase.
Buying (or selling) of bitcoin stands for the exchange of them in and out of currencies like the
Euro or the US Dollar.
62While there are many - and many have also failed already (cf. Moore & Christin, 2013) - one example for an
exchange within the Bitcoin EcoSystem is ‘Bitstamp’ - see https://www.bitstamp.net/ - accessed July 27th
2014.
63Assuming that the exchange is a pure broker of bitcoins only (and not a dealer that does not have a matched-
book 100 per cent of the time).
64In fact, bitcoin is foreign to every currency at every place on this world.
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Miners as regular sellers Most likely regular sellers of bitcoins are to be found among (profes-
sional) miners, which often use specific and therefore expensive hardware (so called application-
specific integrated circuits (ASICs)) to increase their chances in winning the mining lottery, so
to speak, by successfully finding a hash of a block’s header. By selling the awarded bitcoins
on exchanges (professional) miners can obtain Euro’s or $’s or other currency (or much rather
according bankmoney).
The EcoSystem and the MMI In figure 26 we have included a supporting agent we call the
MMI.65 Its importance for the use case ‘Pricing in bitcoin’ was explained in section 7.3.4, however
it is also shown as being relevant for the use case ‘Trading in currencies’. With the relation of
the MMI to this use case we want to account for the fact that users of the CPS currently are
using the BPS and therefore the monies it provides for.66
7.4.3 Users
The aim for this short subsection is to provide an overview on all the different types of primary
users of the entire EcoSystem we have identified by now. We start our summary analysis of
primary users with a simple object diagram shown in figure 27.
Miner
NetworkUser
EcoSystemUser
Trader
SellerBuyerHoarderAdopterPayeePayer
CPSUser
Figure 27: Object diagram on the different potential user types of the Bitcoin EcoSystem.
In the object diagram in figure 27, two primary user types have so far not been explained
completely:
• Buyer
A buyer is one of two types of traders. A buyer wants to change currency he holds on to
into bitcoin (e.g. Euro or US Dollar into bitcoin).
• Seller
A seller is the other type of a trader. A seller wants to sell bitcoins for currency (e.g.
selling bitcoin for Euro or US Dollar).
7.4.4 One nested use case diagram to include it all
If we put all our insights on Bitcoin, the Network and the enclosing EcoSystem together at the
user level, we receive a nested systems diagram that includes:
• the basic functional requirements of any payment system, including a CPS that were found
in section 6
65The idea of a MMI was described in section 6.6.
66Namely currencies - like the Euro or US Dollars - and bankmonies.
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• all the CPSUsers expressly:
– Payer
– Payee
– Adopter
– Hoarder
• the hierarchy of the basic functional requirements and of the emergent properties (the
money of account and the money proper) that were explained for a CPS in section 7.3.1.
• the encompassing system, we call the Network
• the additional NetworkUser that is at the same time a primary and supporting user we
call Miners.
• the all encompassing system we call the EcoSystem that includes all the services offered by
companies and other organizations that revolve around the Network. Expressly included
is the use case ‘Trading in currencies’ that is provided by the EcoSystem in the form of
exchanges, which we include into what we call the MMI which is the last item we want to
mention in this list
• the secondary, supporting actor we call the Money Meta Infrastructure (MMI)
This summarizing and with the explaining comments rather large, yet still not highly complex,
nested systems diagram is to be found in figure 28 on page 63.
7.4.5 Specific risks
Having described the use of the Bitcoin Network as a CPS and its embeddedness into the
EcoSystem we now want to touch upon risks that concern cryptocurrencies in general and
Bitcoin specifically.
Loss of access to bitcoins The access to bitcoins can be lost, if the private keys of the trans-
action points are not available any more, for example by loss or destruction of the wallet file.
This is hardly any different than losing the physical wallet with banknotes in it.
Bitcoin wallets, being simple files, deserve all protection a physical wallet deserves, for it is
not in itself encrypted. All computational measures feasible to protecting the most sensible data
is to be used to protect the wallet. If users do not choose to outsource this responsibility (e.g.
by using web-wallets), the responsibility to protect the wallets is entirely up to the users.
Rising transaction fees Looking at the chart of transaction fees on blockchain.info, we find
that overall fees for transactions have declined to the lowest levels in 12 months.67 Without going
into the details, we can state that right now, at least on the surface, transaction fees are almost
non-existent, if we compared them to fees for international remittances using the BPS. But this
notion might be misleading, since the creation of new bitcoins through mining is what currently
accounts for the investments miners have made in mining hardware. As noted previously, the
creation of bitcoin through mining will decline over time, but we can not assume that relative
cost of mining hardware will in the same fashion. In fact it can’t, for bitcoin creation will at
some point come to an end entirely. There are basically two possibilities:
• Mining declines
67For a chart of transaction fees see http://blockchain.info/charts/transaction-fees - accessed July 28th
2014.
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Figure 28: Nested systems diagram, putting it all together.
63
7.4 Bitcoin EcoSystem 7 BITCOIN
• Transaction fees will rise to make up for lesser revenues from bitcoin creation
A decline in mining might make cryptocurrencies more vulnerable to history revision attacks,
as noted in ‘Incentive for mining’ on page 48. If transaction fees are significantly rising for users
this might lower their willingness to use the CPS as their payment system of choice.
Cryptocurrency competition Bitcoin certainly has the advantage of being the first-mover in
the field of cryptocurrencies, bringing innovations to public understanding and use that has
basically founded this domain or at least set it on a completely new footing. However, there are
no patents in place that would fortify this first-mover position per se. In fact, multiple other
cryptocurrencies have sprung up, mainly as ‘forks’ of the open-source code of Bitcoin itself,
which is thereby furthering cryptocurrency competition one might say. So one potential risk for
Bitcoin is to lose its standing of being recognized as a mathematically and cryptographically
guaranteed cryptocurrency with an ever limited total supply. But if the findings of this work
hold any merit, then the competition among cryptocurrency is probably not just fought on
issues of implementation and the realization of functioning as a CPS, but of how the respective
EcoSystem of the cryptocurrency is responding to user needs.
Technical risk Of course there is the risk that at some point a technical flaw might be discovered
- say in the cryptographic protocol68 - that is not to easily fixed and could therefore destroy
trust in the CPS. So far this hasn’t happened in a way to destroy Bitcoin altogether, but
certain movements in market prices can certainly be attributed to technical problems that made
headlines, even though most of the time these issues did not concern the Network but parts of
the EcoSystem.69
High fluctuations in currency prices Bitcoin prices have been volatile all along even in US
Dollars, which is the bitcoin market with the highest market liquidity. This is a problem for
merchants that have costs in US Dollars (or any other currency for that matter) and would have
revenue in bitcoin, if they’d tag their products with prices in bitcoin, thereby using it as their
money of account. If they are paid in bitcoin for their products, they still have to cover their
costs in US Dollars. With high volatility in prices the likeliness of bitcoin being used as money
of account decreases. Currently merchants tackle this problem by using supporting MMI actors
that are part of the EcoSystem and that offer the taking of this form of foreign currency risk at
premium that is - compared to foreign currency risk - easier calculable for merchants.
This is showing an interesting interconnection of the nation states that provide the MMI for
the BPS and the cryptocurrency EcoSystem. This becomes visible by looking at the concrete
example of a company that is involved in this business of risk taking, called ‘Bitpay’.70 This is
a company located in the jurisdiction of the United States of America and is therefore trusted
by its customers to be able to bear the risk they claim to be able to bear, for they do business
according to US legal standards. If anything went wrong in contracts with Bitpay its users were
able to hold this company accountable within the US jurisdiction.
So, even right now, for bitcoin to be used as a money of account, the adopters depend on the
MMI that the nation state provides, which brings us back to the question of how much of the
MMI requirements currently provided for by nation states for the BPS, the Network might be
able to provide for the CPS.
68For an assessment on vulnerabilities of elliptic curve cryptography - as used in Bitcoin, see Bos et al. (2013).
69One example are the problems the largest bitcoin exchange at the time, called ‘Mt. Gox’, had, before eventually
filing for bankruptcy. For the problems with these type of middlemen in general (and in great anticipation!)
see Moore & Christin (2013).
70see https://bitpay.com/ - accessed July 28th 2014.
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7.5 Beyond a payment system
What we have almost entirely omitted to mention so far, is the actual process of how exactly in
payment transactions within the Network the correctness of digital signatures is established by
validating miners. This is done using an intentionally non-touring complete script language71
that provides the possibility to create multiple different conditions that have to be met, until the
output transaction points can be used as inputs of subsequent transactions or, more colloquially
speaking, until the bitcoins can be spent again.72 Out of the possibilities that the script offers
can be created what is called a ‘contract’.73 These contracts allow - so far mostly theoretically
- for additional use cases that go far beyond the use of Bitcoin and its core innovation, the
blockchain, as a mere payment system and might potentially relief some of the hindrances that
currently inhibit further use and acceptance of bitcoin as money.
7.5.1 Some preliminary use cases
This is the section that is briefly touching on some use cases that are mostly not yet available
for Bitcoin users, but go beyond the payments and payment related use cases we have covered
in this section so far. The analysis is going to comprise use cases that might potentially be
covering parts of what we described in section 6.6 as being the MMI.
Potential for providing
collateral for cryptocurrency
credit agreements?
Virtual property is an item that can be
owned by one entity only, but that is not
centrally managed by one trusted
authority (e.g. the servers of an online
gaming company)
Manage
virtual property
Supposed to provide
'Banking, but without banks'
Alread extensively analysed
in section 7.3
The Credit System is supposed to be 
able to provide credit
Open is the question whether this credit:
- is a mere lending out of currently
dormant bitcoins without changes to the
supply of bitcoins
- or an actual credit agreement, that
creates inside money with bitcoin as
money of account?Provide credit
Provide access to physical (smart)
property that is equipped with locks,
(e.g. engine immobilizer of smart car)
that understand sufficient parts of
the cryptocurrency protocol to verify
rightful owner 
Rate solvency of nodes by analysing
former cash flow and other measures
Manage
smart property
Rate solvency
Property Management System
Credit System
CPS
Network
Figure 29: Diagram showing just some use cases that go beyond Bitcoin as a mere CPS.
Dispute Mediation The script in transactions can be designed in way that allows for rudimen-
tary dispute mediation. The form of dispute mediation that is currently available for Bitcoin
users is what are called ‘multisignature transactions’.74 The 2-of-3 multisignature transaction is
designed in a way that the third party to the transaction, called the mediator, can decide who
gets the money. Whatever happens, the mediator can never get access to the bitcoins himself.
71The imperative Script is similar to FORTH and is stack based, see https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Script -
accessed July 28th 2014.
72This subsection is greatly inspired by a talk of Mike Hearn at the Bitcoin conference 2012 in London. The
slides of the presentation can be accessed at https://docs.google.com - accessed July 28th 2014.
73see https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contracts - accessed July 28th 2014.
74see https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contracts#Theory - accessed July 28th 2014.
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This form of ‘dispute mediation’ must be considered still rather incomplete and will for exam-
ple hardly replace what is currently achieved by employing arbitration courts in conflicts that
can emerge from general business transactions within day-to-day life using the BPS.
In any case, dispute mediation should not be available only, if a very special type of transaction
is chosen. Dispute mediation should be possible in any type of transaction for any party, as it
arguably is in business transactions (at least in western countries) by employing procedures
offered by arbitration courts or other legal remedies provided for by national governments. The
lack of proper dispute mediation (as a part of what we call the MMI) is most likely one of the
key issues that have so far greatly inhibited further seamless use and therefore dissemination of
cryptocurrency technology.
Assurance contracts With assurance contracts a funding model can be realized that releases
the funds pledged only if the targeted amount is hit in total. Otherwise all the funds are returned
(at a predefined date). This resembles what is currently realized outside of the cryptocurrency
world by projects like ‘Kickstarter’.75
A potential use case would be the translation of a website. Interested readers of an article in
a foreign language could pledge a certain (rather small) amount each and the translator is paid
in full after successful (had to be defined) publication of the translated article. If no translator
would be interested, the funds pledged would return after a certain amount of time.
Virtual property The design of ‘contracts’ in the cryptocurrency sense might allow for what
could be called ‘virtual property’. Now, property, as a right, is always ‘virtual’ in a sense.
Property is never a physical thing, it is a right to own, operate, pledge etc. a thing, it is not
the thing itself. ‘Virtual property’ in the cryptocurrency sense can be thought of virtual tokens,
e.g. an item in an online game that is owned and controlled not by a central third party (like
the servers of an online gaming website), but by the individual owner, managed by what could
be called a Property Management System that is operated by the Network.
Smart Property The idea of having smart property in the future is based on the fact that
more and more physical appliances will be equipped with programmable hardware in a way
that allows for this hardware to understand and carry out sufficient parts of the cryptographic
protocol. In this way physical ownership of physical things can be cryptographically controlled.
An example given by Hearn76 is a car that is equipped with an engine immobilizer that allows
for the engine to be started only by the rightful owner with a private key that fits the public
key that the car was signed over to using the cryptographic protocol. The car could in this way
be repossessed (not physically in the sense that it would be towed, but by access management).
7.5.2 Resembling (parts of) the MMI
If the implementation of so called ‘contracts’ within cryptocurrencies is very successful, maybe
they are helpful in creating what has been termed by Hearn “banking, but no banks”. The most
significant part of banking is probably the ability to create collateralized credit agreements.
Collateralized credit agreements If smart property and virtual property can be established it
could potentially be used as collateral in credit agreements. As we have noted in section 6.6,
credit agreements heavily depend on the ability of the debtor to produce enough collateral, and
the ability for the creditor to get access to the collateral in the case of a breach of contract by
the debtor.
75see https://www.kickstarter.com/ - accessed July 28th 2014.
76see footnote 72.
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Automated repossession The design of Bitcoin transactions could potentially by done in way
that can be understood by the hardware of the smart property, thereby granting access to it only
to the rightful owner. For example if the debtor defaults on a collateralized credit agreement, the
smart property might automatically change ownership to the creditor. The transaction designs
implied here are hardly trivial and are subject to future research as the whole field of contracts
is.
7.6 MMI for a CPS
As a thought experiment in an attempt to understand what scope the MMI of a cryptocurrency
would have to have, we could experimentally look at Bitcoin as if it was a transnational economy
on its own. If we think of Bitcoin as an economy we could try to assess its performance the way
nation states are ranked as economies by their ability to enable business activity. One source
for rankings of this kind and also for criteria of assessment is Doing Business.
If we did that how would Bitcoin perform on the ranking of doingbusiness.org?77 ‘Doing
Business’ is a project supported by the World Bank that is trying to measure business regulations
by surveying business owners about the ease of doing business in a specific country.78 The list
of criteria surveyed can be viewed below:
1. Starting a Business
2. Dealing with Construction Permits
3. Getting Electricity
4. Registering Property
5. Getting Credit
6. Protecting Investors
7. Paying Taxes
8. Trading Across Borders
9. Enforcing Contracts
10. Resolving Insolvency
Even being experimentally viewed as a transnational economy on its own, Bitcoin will never be
a physical place. Therefore it will never have to provide physical infrastructure, so many of the
above mentioned criteria do not make a lot of sense to survey for Bitcoin at all. These physical
infrastructure necessities - e.g. ‘Getting Electricity’ - will always have to be provided by the
nation state that claims dominion79 over the physical land, wherever the respective Bitcoin user
is located. However the criteria of protecting investors and enforcing contracts is certainly an
issue for Bitcoin, following our argument about an MMI in section 6.6 that any payment system
needs to be embedded in, if the money the payment system does provide is sought to be used
as such by the users of the payment system.
The example of the rankings at doingbusiness.org clearly shows that business operators do
recognize that the environment for doing business is not the same at every place on this earth.
Even with Bitcoin potentially levelling the playing field for making payments, the infrastructure
differences that reside on this planet will remain highly relevant for all the infrastructure that
is needed for Bitcoin to successfully operate as a CPS.
77http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings - accessed May 14th 2014.
78http://www.doingbusiness.org/ - accessed May 14th 2014.
79‘Ownership, or right to property. Title to an article of property which arises from the power of disposition and
the right of claiming it’ - http://thelawdictionary.org/letter/d/page/114/ - accessed May 15th 2014.
67
8 THE MONEY VIEW ON ACTUALITY
8 The money view on actuality
In this section we want to develop and apply a view on money we want to call the money view
on actuality. First, we will delineate the currently still predominant view on money and banks
and subsequently present a view on money that is rooted in the actuality of the payment system
that is most used today we call the BPS. This ‘money view on actuality’ is based on the findings
in monetary theory that not only has room for money, credit and banks, but is centred right
around them. This view is based on the money view presented in Mehrling (2010), Mehrling
(2012) and Mehrling (2013).80
Motivation Neoclassical, general-equilibrium macroeconomics does not have room for money.
As Frank Hahn famously stated:
“The most serious challenge that the existence of money poses to the theorist is this:
the best developed model of the economy cannot find room for it.” (see Hahn, 1982,
pg. 1)
But why do we even care about this, if we just want to find out in this work if Bitcoin creates
“a new kind of money”? There are two reasons for this:
1. To assess if Bitcoin is money and what kind of money, we want to know as much about
money and the different types of it as possible, thereby further expanding our findings on
money in sections 5 and 6.
2. As it turns out, commercial banks do create bankmoney, which is a widely accepted money
proper that is nearly autonomously created by commercial banks and their debtors. This
money however is not included at all in legal tender laws of governments, even if they
for convenience’s sake use wire transfers themselves. Now, bankmoney is not supported
by legal tender laws of governments, neither is bitcoin, the money created by the Bitcoin
project. Bankmoney however is widely used as money proper in payments, but bitcoin is
far from this level of usage and acceptance. So, by analysing bankmoney we hope to learn
about potential ways to improve usage and acceptance of bitcoin and other cryptocurren-
cies.
We will now proceed by sketching what we perceive as conventional views on money and banks,
to make it distinguishable of what we call the money view on actuality.
8.1 A brief distinction
In this section we are very briefly touching on a conventional view on money and how far the
understanding that it provides brings us in an attempted assessment of cryptocurrencies.
8.1.1 Conventional view on money
Most mainstream macroeconomic models do not contain money, banks or debt.81 Furthermore,
as Mehrling notes, liquidity in the conventional view, is a completely free good in general-
equilibrium macroeconomic theory, which arguably still is the mainstream in macroeconomics
(see Mehrling, 2010, pg. 5 and 65f.). These conditions make it difficult to find a place for cryp-
tocurrency using the tools and models mainstream, general-equilibrium macroeconomic models
deliver.
80The money view is comprehensibly developed in the MOOC of Prof. Dr. Perry Mehrling called ‘Money and
Banking’ available at http://www.coursera.org - accessed June 26th 2014.
81Campiglio (2012) notes that the leading central banks, including the Federal Reserve and the European Central
Bank, are using models that at least until 2012 did not contain private banks at all.
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In the conventional view we describe here money is essentially regarded as if it was a token.
One could say in conventional monetary theory money is a thing, albeit a special one. Since it
is ‘just’ a thing, money is also regarded as being ‘neutral’. The conventional view has no place
for money dealers that provide liquidity, since - in this view - markets are always just cleared at
general equilibrium market prices. In other words, the underlying assumption in conventional
macroeconomics is: liquidity is free, there will always be a market price for everything.
This view of money being neutral and nothing but a special ‘good’ does not help us in this
work. We might say: bitcoin should also be considered a special good, since it has no weight, can
be transferred very cheaply and securely and therefore looking at these convincing properties
should be used as money. We would be finished at this point, but it does not help us answer the
question if it indeed is a new kind of money, in the sense that it will gain widespread adoption.
In the whole of this work we are essentially trying to find out what might stop bitcoin from
generally being used and accepted as money. We therefore need a view on money that at least
allows us to start this type of investigation. A view on money that regards the very issue at
hand as being ‘neutral’ can therefore hardly be a helpful starting point.
8.1.2 Applicability of conventional view
Does the invention of cryptocurrencies in form of the Bitcoin project create a “new kind of
money”?
“If it is used and accepted as money, then it is money. If it isn’t used and accepted,
it can’t be money.”
This completely fictional short quotation would probably have great similarity in content to the
answer we would have to give to the central research question of this work, if we used only the
toolbox that the conventional view on money provides.
An assessment of cryptocurrencies, by trying to find an answer to the question if they indeed
create “a new kind of money” essentially has to fail if we employed a theoretical toolbox that
has no room for money at all. As a side note, if banks are viewed as mere transitory agents of
pre-existing money tokens, or mere ‘intermediaries’ of money, we will not be able to learn much
for the CPS from assessing the BPS. That is why we want to first sketch the ‘money view on
actuality’ and then add it to our analysis.
8.2 Fundamentals of the money view
Here we will introduce some fundamentals ideas to the money view on actuality. First we will
describe a principle that is found all over the place in the actuality of money and banking, in
what can be called the swapping of IOUs. Then we will briefly distinguish inside money from
outside money. This will help in the further assessment of bitcoin, if it indeed is “a new kind
of money’. We finally will briefly try to give an answer to a much asked question when it comes
to the money created by commercial banks, we call bankmoney. The question is: is it money or
just ‘credit’?
8.2.1 Swap of IOUs
The first fundamental concept to the money view sketched here is a so called swap of IOUs,
which is key to understand money and banking. As Mehrling notes, the “essence of banking is
a swap of IOUs” (see Mehrling, 2010, pg. 72).
Double entry bookkeeping - A domain specific modeling language for financial relationships
In this section we make use of stylized balance sheets we want to give a short classification of
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at this point, by putting the notation we use face-to-face to a class diagram of virtually the
same force of expression. In this sense we could view the kind of stylized balance sheet we use
as a domain specific modeling language for the modeling of financial relationships of economic
entities.
In section 5.3 we introduced an essential type of financial relationship that is called ‘creditor-
debtor relationship’. It is conceptually shown in figure 3 on page 16 in an object diagram. We
want to model the creditor-debtor relationship again, using a UML class diagram. It is shown
in figure 30, showing not only the class diagram itself but also an actual instance of it.
owns aowns a
CreditAgreement
-creditor:Creditor
-debtor:Debtor
-amountDue:real
-maturity:Date
CreditAgreement
-creditor=Alice
-debtor=Bob
-amountDue=100
-matur i ty=31/07/2014
Bob:DebtorAlice:Creditor
DebtorCreditor
Figure 30: Class diagram that is showing a creditor-debtor relationship, including an instance
of it for the example we use here right below the line.
The intention here is to show the two ways to model the creditor-debtor relationship, by
bringing them face-to-face. We want to apply it to the most simple example of Alice being the
creditor of Bob, who owes an amount of 100 to her, due on July 31st 2014.
Alice
Creditclaim 100
Bob
Creditclaim 100
Table 1: Stylized balance sheets of Alice and Bob and showing how they can be used to illustrate
a creditor-debtor relationship between Alice and Bob.
One way to illustrate the creditor-debtor relationship between Alice and Bob, is using an
instance of the class diagram as is shown in figure 30. Another way is using the notation with
stylized balance sheets that are contained in table 1. The stylized balance sheets used here do
contain two sides for each economic entity. Showing assets on the left hand side and liabilities
on the right hand side.
For reasons of domain usances and simplicity we will use the second style of notation as we
proceed in this chapter, even though it is on one hand not showing ‘complete’ balance sheets
that conform to accounting standards and on the other hand it does not show certain details
as the class diagram does effortlessly (e.g. maturity date). As was already noted, this notation
involving stylized balance sheets could be seen as being a domain specific modeling language for
financial relationships, specifically useful for the depiction of creditor-debtor relationships.
Example - introducing the swap of IOUs Another simple example shall now illustrate the
principle behind a swap of IOUs, which is a sort of double creditor-debtor relationship. The
following assumptions are made for this illustrating example:
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1. Bob needs a certain amount of money - we set it to 100 - for a project that he can start
as soon as he has the full amount
2. The project will yield back his investment in 60 days
3. Bob wants to get the money from Alice
4. Alice is willing to lend the money to Bob
5. Bob wants to pay back to Alice as soon as his project yielded back the money
6. Alice does not have the money right now
7. Alice is sure that she will have the money necessary in 30 days
8. There will be no interest payments or discounts
Alice and Bob meet and they agree:
1. Alice will give the money to Bob as soon as she has it (in 30 days)
2. Bob will invest the money in his project right away
3. Bob will return the money to Alice as soon as his project has yielded it back
Bob and Alice have effectively agreed upon the swap of IOUs. Alice will pay Bob the amount
of 100 in 30 days. Bob will pay back the full amount in 90 days from now.
If we put this swap of IOUs into a balance sheet that corresponds to double-entry bookkeeping,
we receive the balance sheets in table 2. Alice now has an asset that is a claim on Bob to pay
Alice
IOU90 +100 IOU30 +100
Bob
IOU30 +100 IOU90 +100
Table 2: How the balance sheets of Alice and Bob change, by a swap of IOUs.
100 in 90 days - IOU90 as an asset (left hand side of Alice’s balance sheet) - which corresponds
to the liability of Bob to pay 100 to Alice in 90 days - IOU90 as a liability (right hand side of
Bob’s balance sheet). The same double entry book keeping principle applies to the claim that
now Bob has to receive 100 from Alice in 30 days, correspondingly Alice has to pay 100 in 30
days (right hand side of her balance sheet. This agreement is represented as IOU30 in both
stylized balance sheets.
Notably both balance sheets are enlarged by this operation. Both parties are creditors and
debtors at the same time. It is a mutual exchange of IOUs. To understand this concept is a
key step to understanding how banks can and do create what we call bankmoney in this work.
Bankmoney being an IOU that is due right now (not in 30 or 90 days or any other time frame,
but payable on demand), but is not paid out all the time immediately in full amount. Instead,
bank customers use these, so called, ‘deposits’ that are payable on demand to make payments
with the transfer of these ‘deposits’ (we rather use the term bankmoney). Why this works for
the BPS is analysed in section 8.3.
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8.2.2 Inside money and outside money
The idea to distinct inside money from outside money was probably first developed by Gurley
et al. (1960) in an attempt to distinguish bankmoney (deposits) from currency (termed fiat
money82). If we automatically think of a ‘thing’, when we are thinking of money, then most
likely we assume - probably without consciously intending to do so - that all money is outside
money. But that does not hold, if we take the actuality of money and banking into account.
Outside money Outside money, is an asset that is no ones liability on the ‘inside’ of the
corresponding payment system. At the very least outside money is not expressly booked as
a liability in any actors bookkeeping records. The argument could be made that any outside
money needs to rely on a MMI that is not ‘just there’ but needs to be financed as well. This
financing of the MMI creates a liability that is in nobodies bookkeeping records, but has to be
paid eventually, too.83
Inside money Inside money does not just exist, it is being created. However this creation needs
to be clearly understood as a dynamic process. It is the process of two (or more) contractors
that do not have a contractual relationship at first, then they contract and thereby become
each others creditors and debtors. At the end of the contractual relationship both are neither
creditor nor debtor any more, when all obligations are fulfilled. So inside money creation is not
only the once and for all creation of a token or thing that is bound to stay there forever. The
creation of inside money does already include its ceasing to exist. Inside money is created with
the initiation of the contract and destroyed in the fulfilment of the contract. During the course
of the running contract, inside money can be treated as a ‘token’ in the time between initiation
and fulfilment of the contract. In fact, all money, including inside money, is mistakenly treated
as a ‘token’ in the conventional view on money, as it was described in section 8.1.1.
8.2.3 Money or credit
Whether inside money is money or mere credit depends on the viewpoint this question is asked
from. Bankmoney, as an example, can be viewed as credit, because it can not be used as means
of final settlement of debt among the bankmoney creating banks themselves. The same is true
for debts that are due to the central bank, which is the bank of the commercial banks. Amounts
payable to the central bank can never be paid by transferring bankmoney, these dues have to
be settled by the central banks currency. From the viewpoint of the commercial banks among
each other or even the central bank on top, bankmoney is mere credit. It can not be used as
money proper, as means of effectuating final settlement of debt without discount.
This is different, if considered from the viewpoint of non-banks. Non-banks can indeed effec-
tuate final settlement of debt without discount by bankmoney. Firstly, with their commercial
banks and secondly, in wire transferring the bankmoney to other non-banks thereby effectuating
payments.
The question whether a financial asset is money or credit cannot be finally answered once and
for all, for each and every financial asset. The answer to this question changes depending on the
82The notion of fiat money implies that it is created from government decree. It is thought of as essentially falling
out of the sky (or being dropped from a helicopter) as a thing or that it is simply created out of nothing and
that it was created to stay. The notion of so called governmental ‘fiat money’ as being outside money is very
misleading and does not correspond to the money view on actuality. In actuality central banks balance sheets
are enlarged by the creation of so called ‘fiat money’. A better term for the misleading ‘fiat money’ is the term
currency we use in this work. Currencies are inside monies.
83It will be interesting to see how much of a MMI can be resembled with the use of the Network, if it is used
beyond a CPS and if eventually the cost for the financing of a MMI can be reduced in the future.
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viewpoint that is taken within - what Mehrling calls - ‘the hierarchy of money’ (see Mehrling,
2012, pg. 1).
The hierarchy of monies The hierarchy of money is built by the way contractual relationships
are structured. So, for example, if on an international level contracts were nominated and
payable in gold only, then gold would be the means of international payments (international
money proper). If a central bank has to make an international payment of this kind (payable in
gold), it can not use its own money, we call currency.
On a national level, commercial banks are customers of central banks. To make payments
to the central bank, commercial banks can not employ their own bankmoney. The only means
of payment (money proper) they are able to use is the one that is specified in the contract
that created the debt. Normally, this is the currency that central banks create. Banks can not
create currency, only central banks can do so. Central banks can not create (necessarily) the
international money proper. This is what is creating the hierarchy.
On the bottom of the hierarchy, so to speak, are the non-banks. For non-banks bankmoney
is money (money proper), because non-banks can make payments to their bank creditors (com-
mercial banks) and they can make payments to non-bank creditors using bankmoney (e.g. if an
invoice contains a bank account number, this implies legally that the invoicing party will accept
payments in bankmoney).
For commercial banks bankmoney is not money, it’s credit. They regard currency as being
money, because they can effectuate payments to their creditors (other banks and the central
bank) by using currency.
For central banks that have debts payable in a currency other than their own, to that extent
their own currency is not money, even though it is money for the commercial banks and non-
banks within its jurisdiction.
So, we see that this question whether it is money or mere credit can not be answered without
the clear delimitation of the environment or the viewpoint this question is asked from. Once
again, we need to be very precise in this domain of money.
Relevance for cryptocurrencies For any single cryptocurrency there is hardly any hierarchy
to be observed yet, but this may change over time. The better the MMI for cryptocurren-
cies is, the more actors will nominate their contractual relationships in the money of account
and will therefore potentially initiate a hierarchy of contractual relationships in the respective
cryptocurrency.
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8.3 Banking Payment System
The payment system that is provided by the cooperation of commercial banks of all kinds
(private banks, credit unions, savings banks etc.), we call the Banking Payment System (BPS).
In this section we want to establish an understanding of the BPS to a degree that allows for
the assessment of Bitcoin as a Cryptocurrency Payment System relative to the properties of the
BPS.
Non-bank businesses,
households and governmental
agencies that are not banking
with the central bank
Bankmoney can be held on to
on checking accounts, thereby
not insisting on the maturity date
of the bankmoney, which is daily
The MMI of the BPS is provided
for by several agencies and
institutions, mostly provided for
by national governments and
their regulatory or executive
bodies (e.g. bailiffs, courts etc.)
Non-banks pay within the
BPS by wire transfer (or similar
instruments) of bankmoney
Pricing happens in the money
of account of currencies.
The currencies are created
as inside money by central banks
and supported by the MMI
that the nation state provides
Provided by commercial banks
of various kinds:
- private banks
- credit unions
- savings banks
MMINon-Banks Holding on
to bankmoney
Pricing
in currency
Paying
with bankmoney
«include»
«include»
BPS
Figure 31: Use case diagram showing the BPS and its users, the so called non-banks.
Primary actors
• Commercial Banks, including private banks, credit unions and savings banks, as banks for
the non-banks
• Non-Banks, i.e. private businesses, organizations and households
The users of the BPS are non-bank businesses and households that utilize it to make national
(and potentially international) payments, e.g. by wire transfers, checks and electronic funds
transfers.
Other key stakeholders
• National Governments (e.g. as participants in international contracts, national regulations,
law enforcement, etc. - in short: as providers of the MMI)
• Central Banks as banks for the commercial banks
What makes the BPS interesting for the assessment of CPS The BPS does currently provide
a type of inside money we call bankmoney, as described in section 8.3.1 below. Most notably
this form of money, created by commercial banks, is not included in legal tender laws of gov-
ernments, yet it is accepted in final settlement of debts in-between banks and non-banks but
also in payments among non-banks. This is a very interesting condition that might bear great
insights for the CPS. The reason being that the CPS - in the design provided for by the Bitcoin
project (see section 7.3) - does also create a money that is not included in legal tender laws of
governments. We want to look at differences in the money proper that the BPS creates and that
is widely accepted, called bankmoney, and the proposed money proper of the CPS that hasn’t
yet reach such a level of acceptance, called ‘bitcoin’.
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8.3.1 How banks create inside money
Building on our understanding of a swap of IOUs (see section 8.2.1) we want to describe
very briefly by means of an example how commercial banks create the inside money we call
‘bankmoney’.
The example is set up as follows:
• Two actors, a creditor and a debtor
• The creditor is called Commercial Bank, the debtor is called Customer
• The principal is 100, the maturity set to one year (360 days) and interest after one year is
fixed at 5 per cent.
• The claim for the bank out of the credit agreement is named ‘Claim’ in the stylized balance
sheet of the Commercial Bank
• The liability for the debtor out of the credit agreement is named ‘Claim’ in the stylized
balance sheet as well, to indicate their mutual representation of one creditor-debtor rela-
tionship in the two balance sheet (confer the explanation on the use of stylized balance
sheets in section 8.2.1)
Table 3 is depicting the change on both balance sheets after the credit agreement is made.
This is showing the creation of bankmoney in this transaction, by increasing the Deposits.
Commercial Bank
Claim360 +100 Deposits0 +100
Customer
Deposits0 +100 Claim360 +100
Table 3: How a commercial bank’s and its customer’s balance sheets are changing by an engage-
ment in a credit agreement. The indices are indicating the time to maturity.
Table 4 shows the change on both balance sheets after the final payment is made, paying the
amount of 100 for the principal of Claim0 that is now due and the interest payment of 5, too,
thereby reducing the equity of the Customer and increasing the equity of the Commercial Bank.
This is the destruction of bankmoney, by reducing the overall Deposits by 100 (interest payments
Commercial Bank
Claim0 -100 Deposits0 -105
Equity +5
Customer
Deposits0 -105 Claim0 -100
Equity -5
Table 4: How a commercial bank’s and its customer’s balance sheets are changing by the final
payment of principal (100) + interest (5).
ending up in bank’s equities are eventually either paid out in dividends or other consumption).
This is very typical for inside money. It is being created in a creditor-debtor relationship and
ceases to exist as soon as the creditor-debtor relationship ends.
8.3.2 Usage and acceptance of bankmoney
Bankmoney, being created in a mutual exchange of IOUs is inside money. We want to present
an idea here why this form of money potentially is used and accepted the way it is.
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Creditor banks have to accept payments in their own bankmoney The bankmoney creating
commercial banks, do have to accept the tendering of bankmoney as payment by their own
debtors. A bank creditor that is offered a payment in bankmoney from one of its debtor-
customers has to accept this payment in final settlement of debt in the full amount of the
offer. Declining their short term liabilities (called ‘deposits’ or better still bankmoney) as a
means of payment or even just taking it only at a discount, is effectively declining their own
promissory notes and banks doing this are thereby saying nothing less than that these notes are
no good. This is equal to a default of the non-accepting bank. To avoid this type of default
commercial banks have to accept their own short term-liabilities (maturity date ‘immediate’),
we call bankmoney, in final settlement of debt without discount.
Non-banks We want to mention possible reasons why non-banks do voluntarily accept
bankmoney as a means of final settlement of debt in their private non-bank to non-bank con-
tracts, thereby possible reasons that revolve around mere usability and convenience issues.
Firstly, as a limitation, the non-banks use the currency of the respective nation state as
money of account, as do all the banks. It is not the case that every single bank is introducing
an individual money of account, however they arguable create individual monies proper. Again,
it becomes clear how valuable it is to have a terminological toolbox rich enough to be able to
distinct the money of account from the money proper. So, the non-banks and the banks rely on
the MMI of their responsible and applicable jurisdiction.
Secondly, and being the key reason we suppose, non-banks probably accept bankmoney as
money proper in final settlement of their debts, because they themselves (seen as an aggregate)
are in debt to the banks and can settle those debts by means of the transfer of bankmoney to the
bank. This is a point that has so far been mostly neglected in cryptocurrency research. For the
potential users of cryptocurrencies are so far not at all in debt, nominated and payable in the
cryptocurrency. There is - so far - no credit structure created that sits on top of any cryptocur-
rency. If a cryptocurrency is currently accepted as money proper, then this is most likely not
due to debts that the accepting party (e.g. a merchant) needs to pay in the cryptocurrency.84
This leads us to the conclusion on this work.
84On the contrary, most merchants accepting bitcoin today, do so only by using additional services the EcoSystem
provides for, thereby relying on parts of the MMI that is supporting the BPS, see footnote 70.
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This section is aiming to provide a compact conclusion on the entirety of this work, by first
recapitulating the findings of this work, so far, and then subsequently drawing final conclusions
out of these findings for the research question this work is based upon.
9.1 Recapitulation
We want to briefly recap this works findings, by going through it step by step. This work was
started by laying foundations on:
• Cryptography
• Cryptocurrencies
• Software Engineering
These foundations were laid in a compact way that allowed for the main part of the work to
build upon them. These introductory chapters did not aim to gain any new insights whatsoever.
Linguistic toolbox We then developed a linguistic toolbox of terms in the domains of money
and cryptocurrencies. This was done by performing a requirements analysis - focussing on
functional requirements - for a hypothetical payment system. This analysis yielded the emergent
properties of payment systems, the money proper and the money of account that were assigned
into what is called the hierarchy of functional requirements for payment systems in this work.
Assessing cryptocurrencies Having this toolbox of precise terms, we started the main part
of this work, which was the assessment of cryptocurrencies by reverse engineering parts of the
Bitcoin project, especially the way it is used as a payment system by its users. This assessment
was done through the view of a software engineer by means of modeling technology. The aim
was never to produce an extensive class diagram that was only one step short of being executable
code 85, but rather by taking an approach form the macro view, having the user perspective in
mind and the goal to get an understanding of functional principles of cryptocurrencies, executed
by example of the Bitcoin project. The user perspective on Bitcoin seems important enough to
take because it turns out that it is right now just not used as much as its proponents would like
it to be used, in there hope it “will be bigger than Facebook”.86
The MMI Thanks to the toolbox developed by means of requirements engineering principles
and to the understanding of the Bitcoin project through software modeling principles the role
of the MMI for payment systems in general could be uncovered. It is the central insight of this
work that the embeddedness of a payment system into a Money Meta Infrastructure is necessary,
for it to yield a money, which is confidently used by users of the payment system as the money
of account and accepted as the money proper.
The lacking of a MMI entirely for any cryptocurrency project or at least shortcomings within
the MMI that are probably the main reason cryptocurrencies have not found more widespread
use and acceptance. The lack of a proper MMI will be inhibiting further dissemination of
cryptocurrency use and acceptance as long as these shortcomings are not overcome. Either by
integrating cryptocurrencies into the already existing MMI, by means of regulation or other
85A class diagram of this kind can be generated any time, out of the already existing open source code of Bitcoin
- see for example https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin - accessed July 29th 2014.
86see http://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/news/winklevoss-twins-bitcoin-will-bigger-facebook/2014/05/
20 accessed July 24th 2014.
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measures, or by creating a totally new kind of MMI by cryptographic means, which - if done
successfully - bears in it revolutionary potential not only for currencies, but for society in general.
One possible idea, if a non-nation state MMI can be established by cryptographic or other means,
is an institution we could best describe as a world credit union, powered by the (smart) property
of millions of little shareholders and emitting an inside money that would be way more stable
in prices, than the outside money that bitcoin is, is right now.87 88
9.2 On Bitcoin
In this subsection we provide our final thoughts on the specific cryptocurrency project we assessed
in this work, called Bitcoin using all the tools and understanding portrayed up to this point.
Agile view Certainly, right now, Bitcoin does not utilize its full potential. Especially the lack
of what we call the MMI and the high volatility in prices in currencies create challenges for
merchants willing to use bitcoin as their money of account. Could Bitcoin - as a CPS - be
considered like a first and early version of an already running software in an agile software
development process? Could Bitcoin be considered a piece of running software that just does
not yet cover all the extensions and exceptions? For example, if two parties are engaged in a
contract that specifies payment in bitcoin, the Bitcoin Network is indeed able to provide final
settlement of this debt that is specified in bitcoin, but does it - or rather the MMI it is embedded
in - provide remedies for all the possible extensions and exceptions in this payment process? The
answer currently has to be no, at least for the standard two party transaction that is currently
predominantly used in the Bitcoin CPS.
Bitcoin as money proper is outside money Being able to settle debt that is specified in bitcoin
means that the Bitcoin Network used as a CPS does provide for a working money proper, since
the technology behind the cryptocurrency allows for effective payments within the Network as
was shown in section 7.3.3. However the money proper created by the Network used as a CPS
differs greatly from the money proper that the BPS offers. The money proper called bitcoin is
outside money, for it is no-ones liability89, the money proper that banks create is inside money.
If we wanted to show the creation of bitcoin after successful mining as outside money, using our
notation of stylized balance sheets we would end up with the illustration in table 5 below.
Miners
bitcoins +25
Table 5: The creation of brand new bitcoins as outside money by a successful miner increases
the bitcoin supply by (currently, July 2014) 25 bitcoins. There are no (obvious) cor-
responding liabilities anywhere, as there would be, if bitcoins were created as inside
money.
In this sense, the Bitcoin project does indeed create “a new kind of money” it is an endogenous
money that is created within the payment system itself (by the process of mining), but it is not
87Based on an idea of Prof. Dr. Dr. Gunnar Heinsohn, expressed in a weblog, see https://blog.
malik-management.com/gelddigitalisierung-und-eigentumsoekonomie/ - accessed July 30th 2014.
88This idea, as is a non central government based MMI in general, certainly is far out. But, whatever we can
think of might be possible.
89As is totally correctly noted in the assessment of cryptocurrencies that the German Bundesanstalt für Finanz-
dienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) published most recently (see Münzer, 2014). It is interesting to find that -
unlike most economists - some regulatory bodies (like the BaFin in this case) seem to have a look on monies
quite close to what we briefly described as the money view on actuality in section 8.
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inside money as the endogenous money created in the BPS, called bankmoney. This suggests a
careful distinction of endogenous money and inside money that was so far unnecessary for the
BPS.
Bitcoin Network does not have a fully functioning money of account Currently bitcoin is not
widely used as a money of account in purchase agreements by large sections of the population
in any nation state. The pricing of assets, goods and services is still mainly done in currencies.
So far, bitcoin is hardly used in credit agreements or any other type of long term contract
anywhere. We suppose, this has to do with the lack of an effective MMI that allows for contract
enforcement and other supporting services and measures, as was explained in section 6.6. A
lack in the embedded MMI of this kind is what makes the proposed money of account, called
‘bitcoin’, unattractive to use in any contract.
Additionally the high volatility in prices in currency are problematic for merchants. This
probably has to do with the way bitcoins are created as a form of outside monies and the MMI
not yet providing for deep-pocket market makers, therefore lacking high market liquidity, which
results in high volatility of prices. This is a field that almost screams for future research.
More regulation If the lacking of an effective MMI was indeed responsible for the still limited
success of cryptocurrencies, the aim to improve the MMI suggests itself. The question is in what
way this improvement can and will be made in the future. There are two possibilities:
1. Integrate Bitcoin into financial regulation that is provided by central governments, to profit
from the MMI that is also used by the BPS
2. Further the possibilities that the Network itself may provide, by investigating and imple-
menting cryptocurrency related ‘contracts’, as described in section 7.5, and other features
of the Network that are yet laying dormant and are waiting for applicable implementation.
1. Integrate into existing MMI The call for a more effective and reliable MMI for Bitcoin
might be construed as a call for an integration of Bitcoin into the MMI that currently powers
the BPS by means of regulation and other measures. The regulation however, relying on central
authorities enforcing them, is exactly what does not correspond to the notion that Bitcoin might
remove any third party from financial transactions in general.
A steadfast decline of interconnecting Bitcoin with regulatory bodies of any nation state, by
proper regulation, might potentially undermine further success for Bitcoin and other cryptocur-
rencies as widely used and accepted monies. Such a decline is rather unlikely in the long term,
since even today if there are problems with trades in bitcoin and currency, the courts of nation
states are used by litigant parties.90
On the other hand regulation might be considered taking away an essential use case for Bitcoin
that is currently made use of by people that are critical of central governments and the BPS in
general, which is stashing away monetary or near-money assets that are completely outside of
the control of central governments.
2. Create a totally new MMI The currently most used type of two party transaction91 will
most likely have to loose importance in usage, to other types of transactions, because it does
90for a court ruling on failed bitcoin delivery, see http://www.coindesk.com/
dutch-court-declares-bitcoin-isnt-money-in-civil-trial/ - accessed July 29th 2014.
91The standard two party type of transaction is known as ‘Pay-to-PubkeyHash’, because the payment is made to
the hash of the public key provide, as is described extensively in section 7.3 - see also https://en.bitcoin.
it/wiki/Transactions#Pay-to-PubkeyHash - accessed July 30th 2014.
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not provide for built-in remedies of any kind in case there was any nuisance in the underlying
agreement that made the payment necessary in the first place.
Other forms of transactions will gain in importance immediately, if they can resemble parts
of what we called the MMI in this work.92
However, it has to be noted that no matter how complex and sophisticated the ‘contracts’
that are possible to create with new types of transaction, there will always be a ‘physical’
component to contract enforcement and other MMI necessities. This will most likely leave
cryptocurrencies with only one choice: find a way to integrate into the MMI of nation states,
without cryptocurrencies losing every aspect of their power of fascination.
Furthering monetary theory Due to their current design, if the worst came to the worst for
cryptocurrencies, they could at any time experience a massive blow to their acceptance and
credibility. Such an event would not have to be highly likely, but certain technical occurrences,
especially concerning the cryptography employed by the project, could potentially mean the
sudden death of any cryptocurrency, if they ever occurred. However, even in this case, cryp-
tocurrencies might still provide a significant contribution. If they effectively won’t do anything,
but inspire monetary theorists to create an understanding of money that allows for a more com-
plete assessment of cryptocurrencies, then this alone could be regarded as being a very valuable
contribution to the ongoing discourse about money and banks. At least since the beginning of
the financial crisis of 2007/2008, the better understanding of money and the inclusion of money
and banks in macroeconomic theory and political practice is widely discussed, as it is now -
probably more than ever since the Great Depression of the 20th century - perceived to be much
needed.93 We believe to have shown in this work that the specificity of the design of cryp-
tocurrency calls for an understanding of money that goes way beyond the view of money being
nothing more than a special kind of good that lowers cost of transactions in a barter economy.
92There is one other type of transaction available so far that is called a m-of-n multi-signature transaction which
is a form of ‘Pay-to-Script-Hash’ transaction. The ‘Pay-to-Script-Hash’ transactions allow for what is called
‘contracts’, since they make it possible to create complex conditions for the transaction outputs to be redeemed.
93see ongoing discussion at the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) at http://ineteconomics.org/ -
accessed July 29th 2014.
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10 Future research
In this closing section on future research we want to very briefly touch upon certain alleys that
opened up as potential ways of further inquiry in the creation of this work, which is topically
sitting on the intersections of multiple fields of research, as was mentioned in the preface of this
work.
Furthering the understanding of the MMI Further research is needed on the scope of a MMI
that actually is necessary to run a successful cryptocurrencies. A potential start would be to
enquire banking practitioners about the properties they demanded for a cryptocurrency to be
used as money of account in credit agreements.
Clarifying legal remedies To enhance the research on the MMI necessary for a payment sys-
tem based on a cryptocurrency, a deep enquiry of currently available legal remedies might be
promising. We have so far just stated their use, e.g. in the activity diagram in figure 8 on
page 32, without describing them in detail. If this enquiry on legal remedies is done, a step-by-
step comparison of the legal remedies on one hand and the current and potential capabilities
of cryptocurrencies on the other. We have briefly touched upon potential capabilities of cryp-
tocurrencies that go beyond the use of them as a mere payment systems in section 7.5.
Contracts, trust and communication Much more research is needed on contracts in digital
environments in general. A potential starting point for such an inquiry could be Szabo (1997).
Maybe even going back another step and starting with communications in general, looking at
the actual requirements of societies is a viable approach. Currently, in western societies there
certainly is a requirement for being able to formally communicate by contracts. These contracts
are currently formalized by civil legal procedures and secured by collateral that is property
(cf. Heinsohn & Steiger, 1996). The contracts need to enforceable, if necessary, by reasonable,
effective means. Hence the need for a MMI. Contracts of this type are nothing but a form of
communication.
The idea of money as a medium of communications is from Luhman, being another potential
starting point for further inquiry. In his view this communication consists first and foremost of
payments. He once deemed payments the ‘unit act’ of economics (see Luhmann, 1988, pg. 52).
Already in 1973 Luhman wrote about trust:
“He who has money does not have to trust others. The general trust in the institution
of money replaces the single, uncountable and difficult expressions of trust that were
necessary to guarantee the fulfilment of human necessities in a cooperative society,
by one single global act.”94
He clearly sees money as the central point of trust. Cryptocurrencies now try to dissolve this
centrality. But do they dissolve the essence of money with that?
There is much more research needed in this field. The feeling remains that the inquiry has
hardly even begun. It may start with an assessment of the potential of the bitmessage protocol.95
94This is not a direct quote but a translation by the author of this work at hand. The original quote by Luhman
in German is: “Wer Geld hat, braucht insoweit anderen nicht zu vertrauen. Das generalisierte Vertrauen in die
Institution des Geldes erstetzt dann jene unzähligen einzelnen und schwierigen Vertrauenserweise, die nötig
wären, um den Lebensbedarf in einer kooperativen Gesellschaft sicherzustellen, durch einen Globalakt.” (see
Luhmann, 1973, pg. 55).
95see Warren (2012).
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Deep modeling The conclusions on money, the hierarchy of money and other types of money,
currencies and the emergent properties of payment systems in general (money of account and
money proper) are potentially suitable for further inquiry using state of the art modeling technol-
ogy that is termed ‘deep modeling’, see Kennel (2012). Initially the inclusion of deep modeling
technology was thought of as potentially being already part of this work, but it turned out to
be beyond this work. Nevertheless the feeling remains that this domain of monies does need
further inquiry from software engineers that bring a totally different perspective to the picture
than economists do. Deep modeling might be the next step of valuable tools to further the
understanding of this domain with the software engineering perspective.
Furthering systems engineering on financial systems Not only software but systems engi-
neering in general might be a promising path to an increased understanding of money, banks
and the financial system in general and there is certainly to be found some low hanging fruits
in systems engineering in the deeper evaluation of cryptocurrencies. For interesting approaches
to modeling banks and the financial system with the help of systems engineering tools we refer
to Keen (2004) and most recently Keen (2014).
Triple entry bookkeeping A potentially promising field of research right on this intersection of
cryptography and money is so called triple entry bookkeeping. While we have mentioned double
entry bookkeeping, when we were describing the creation of bankmoney, we could not touch on
triple entry bookkeeping at all in this work. For more information on triple entry bookkeeping,
we refer to Grigg (2004) and Grigg (2005).
Disclaimer With this work being ‘completed’ by now, I just barely understand enough to
essentially realize that most of this works insights needed to be looked at from many additional
angles to produce conclusions that could potentially render actual real-life use right away.
The hope remains that readers of this work gain insights on the issues covered nonetheless and
can push the boundary of understanding much further in future research than was ever aimed
for and possible with this work.
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